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This thesis examines the relationship between the United States and Great Britain 
during the era of slave trade suppression in the nineteenth century.  Two ideals of 
international relations came into conflict when Great Britain’s humanitarian drive to rid 
the world of the international slave trade ran headlong into the United States’ claims to 
sovereignty under the Law of Nations.  Under international maritime law a ship is the 
sovereign territory of the nation under whose flag it sails; the forcible boarding of a ship 
is tantamount to an invasion of the country itself.  Britain sought to circumvent this rule 
in the pursuit of their humanitarian cause by negotiating bilateral treaties with all 
maritime powers, allowing the reciprocal right to search the vessels of every signatory, 
therefore nullifying that tenant of international maritime law.  The United States 
remained a “persistent objector,” refusing to go along with the plan, despite its 
humanitarian purpose.  British government sources and those of many historians charge 
that American intransigence was mainly driven by American slave interests, but records 
drawn from Congressional sources, the United States Department of State, and the United 
States Navy show that the U.S. was more interested in protecting the sovereignty of ships 
that flew the American flag from the aggressive actions of the British Navy.  The British 
finally gave up trying to force the Americans to adopt the right to visit and search in 
1858.  Four years later, the United States negotiated a right to search agreement with 
Great Britain.  When the Civil War ended, the African slave trade, for the most part, 
came to end.  American sovereignty was never compromised, but the price of that 
  
vi 
sovereignty was the hundreds of thousands of slaves who crossed the Atlantic, under the 
Stars and Stripes, to a life of forced labor.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION – AMERICAN AND BRITISH EFFORTS TO 
END THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 
In 1808 the United States and Great Britain declared war on the international 
slave trade by enacted legislation abolishing the trade in human chattel.  Each approached 
suppression of the slave trade in different ways though.  The British committed a large 
fleet to the effort, sacrificing its international reputation as well as vast sums of money 
and men.  The United States had a naval presence off of the coast of Africa from time to 
time, and a permanent squadron between 1842 and 1860, but they were never as robust as 
the British in their efforts though, in fact, the United States was often less than 
cooperative with the British efforts on the high seas.  Why was the United States such a 
thorn in the side of the British if both nations had abolished the trade?  Over and over 
again the historical record shows American leaders crying “Sovereignty!” whenever the 
British stopped an American-flagged ship suspected of slaving.  The issue of sovereignty, 
as it was defended by the United States, frustrated the suppression effort on all sides. 
Like Supreme Court justices that decide a case the same way, but for different 
constitutional reasons, Great Britain and the United States attempted to suppress the trade 
concurrently rather than jointly.  The British cast their net as wide as possible, gaining the 
legal right to search as many ships from as many nations as they could.  They negotiated 
bilateral treaties with numerous nations with the “reciprocal right to search,” under which 
the signatories had the right to stop and search suspected slavers, have them tried in 
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Courts of Mixed Commission (with judges from both signatories), and, if found guilty, 
have their ships condemned and their cargoes released.  In practice the British had the 
only navy large enough to commit a fleet solely to suppression duties.  The United States 
only searched ships under the Stars and Stripes.  The American plan was to only target 
American nationals, to equate slaving with piracy, to deliver suspected slavers to 
American courts, and to allow juries to determine their guilt or innocence.  The penalty 
for piracy was death and the possibility of a conviction was believed to be enough to 
dissuade Americans from trading in slaves.  There was no attempt to work with other 
nations in the international realm. 
Legal issues plagued the suppression effort on both sides.  The idea of the “Rule 
of Law” was ingrained in the English mind from the time of Magna Carta in 1215.  The 
English lived by known rules of law established by Parliament, and when the English 
established colonies in America the concept of the rule of law was established along with 
them.  By the 1770s each of the thirteen British colonies that became the United States 
had a written constitution with a foundation in the rule of law.  The Constitution that the 
United States developed in 1789, like the state constitutions before it, was based on the 
rule of law.  It was fitting that these two nations became locked in legal battles as they 
determined to reach the same goal by different means. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the British sought to induce the United States 
into a “Right to Search” agreement, but the latter refused.  Even as more and more of the 
slave trade fell under the Stars and Stripes, the United States remained a persistent 
objector, arguing that the searching of American ships was an illegal violation American 
sovereignty: the forceful intrusion onto an American-flagged ship was tantamount to an 
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invasion of the United States itself.  The boarding of American ships by the French 
brought about a “Quasi-War” in 1798.  The boarding of American ships by the British 
and the impressment of American sailors sparked an actual war in 1812.  These violations 
of sovereignty were fresh in the minds of American politicians and naval captains as 
suppression ramped-up in the 1830s and 1840s.  The United States refused to sign on to 
any agreement that allowed any violation of their sovereign rights, no matter how hard 
the British pressed or how humanitarian the cause.  As Britain coerced more states into 
their right to search conventions it gained momentum for codifying the right to search 
into international maritime law, but the United States continually acted as the “persistent 
objector” in this drive. 
The United States had good cause to question British intentions in intercepting 
ships flying the American flag.  The relationship between the two was still adversarial, 
having fought in a war of independence, a war in 1812, and nearly going to war again in 
1844 over the Oregon Country.  Frustration with British searches of American ships goes 
back to the days leading up to the Revolutionary War.  The British authorities in the 
American colonies used “Writs of Assistance” to search Americans’ homes for 
contraband smuggled into the colonies.  The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was 
a reaction to the government’s use of Writs of Assistance, specifically outlawing the 
search and seizure of private property by the government without a warrant based upon 
probable cause; the warrant itself must state specifically the contraband for which the 
party is searching.  Now, the British were proposing a plan to stop American ships, and 
search for slaves and possibly for British subjects, and possibly for American seamen that 
could help in another British cause.  British searches of American ships on the high seas 
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seemed more like enforcing Writs of Assistance than helping in a humanitarian cause.  
To the average American, “If my own government is barred from searching and seizing 
my property without probable cause, why should my own government let a foreign entity 
search my property?” 
Consider the situation where a man was robbing a house and a neighbor goes into 
the house to stop him.  Under normal circumstances the homeowner might appreciate his 
neighbor’s effort.  But what if the homeowner did not trust his neighbor, had a long 
history of bad run-ins with him, and believed that he had ulterior motives.  In the case of 
the British searching American ships, it was like a “Hatsfield” entering a “McCoy” house 
to stop a robbery.  The “McCoy” does not want a “Hatsfield” in his home under any 
circumstances.  The “Hatsfield” may stop the robber, apprehend him, and then take the 
“McCoy’s” TV.  One would rather have a legitimate police force involved in the 
investigation and apprehension of the perp than have someone that he does not trust.  The 
Americans did not to trust the British. 
Differences in legal systems also plagued the two sides.  The United States 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment assumes that the accused, even 
an accused slaver, is “innocent until proven guilty.”  “Better that ninety-nine criminals go 
free than an innocent man be condemned.”  Allowing the British to board “suspected” 
slavers to search or to visit turns that legal concept on its head, allowing the British to 
detain a merchant and search, assuming guilt until the captain could prove the ship’s 
innocence. 
Considering the combination of American intransigence and the increase in the 
number of slavers were flying the American flag without the proper authority, the British 
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demanded the right to visit in order only to check paperwork.  The Americans remained 
intransigent, arguing that a visit was the same thing as a search, a violation of American 
sovereignty. In the robbery metaphor the neighbor might not enter the house while the 
robbery is in progress, but may now peer through the windows.  What if there was no 
crime occurring but the neighbor peered through to get a good look at the master’s wife?  
For the United States this situation was entirely unacceptable.  A few Americans 
demanded that ships flying the Stars and Stripes were not to be visited, no matter how 
suspicious they seemed.  The legal and semantic battle between the United States and 
Great Britain continued for fifty years until 1858 when the British finally relented in their 
efforts to force American compliance and gave up the demand for the right to search.  
Four years later, during the Civil War, the United States agreed to allow their ships to be 
searched.  The Union victory in the war ended slavery in the United States and searches 
of slavers, for the most part, became a moot point. 
Earlier studies of slave trade suppression downplay the issue of sovereignty.  
There were other elements in the minutiae that dominated the slave trade suppression.  
Foreign policy is developed by governments but it is carried out by individual people 
with ideas, feelings, motivations and hostilities.  Certainly pro-slavery officials were not 
likely to press for the strict enforcement of American anti-slave trade law, and as long as 
slavery was legal in the United States, suppressing the trade in slaves seemed 
hypocritical.  The first comprehensive study of the American suppression effort was by 
W.E.B. DuBois in 1896.  In The Suppression of the African Slave Trade DuBois suggests 
that the United States effort was minimal because they were still the greatest slave power 
in the world and cooperation with London was a slap to the South.  “The reason why 
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Americans were opposed to allowing Britain the right to search American ships,” said 
DuBois, “was that nine-out-of-ten times the search turned up slaves.”1  It was not until 
the Southern states seceded and their Senators were recalled that the Americans 
redoubled their efforts. 
British studies, like Christopher Lloyd’s The Navy and the Slave Trade and 
W.E.F. Ward’s The Royal Navy and the Slavers, suggest that the reason for lack of 
cooperation with the British was that the United States was a new country, driven by 
youthful exuberance to throw off the chains of imperial Britain.  After fifteen years of 
American citizens being forced to serve on British warships and the two years of war 
brought about by impressment, most Americans of the early nineteenth century harbored 
intense hostility toward the British.  Two of the most hostile men, important to the 
American part of the suppression enterprise, were Lewis Cass, the United States’ 
ambassador to France, and Nicholas Trist, United States’ Consul in Cuba.  Cass was 
instrumental in turning French public opinion against a slave trade suppression treaty 
with Great Britain.2  Trist continually gave American assent to the sale of American ships 
to known Spanish slavers allowing them to use the American flag and to enjoy the 
protection of American maritime law. 3  Both men used their positions to befuddle 
                                                 
1
 W.E.B. DuBois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade (Williamstown, MA: Corner House 
Publishers, 1970; First Edition 1896): 165. 
2
 Nicholas Trist’s position concerning slavery and the British are detailed in “Chapter 6: Nicholas 
Trist: General-Counsel in Havana.”   
3
 Lewis Cass’s position concerning slavery and the British are detailed in “Chapter 7: Lewis Cass 
and the Quintuple Treaty.” 
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Britain’s suppression efforts and they did this, not because they were necessarily in favor 
of slavery, but because of their own hostility to the British. 
Although slavery existed in all parts of the world, the scope of this study will be 
limited to the trans-Atlantic slave trade between West Africa and the Americas, where 
American and British interests crossed each other.  The British Suppression Acts 
demanded the worldwide suppression of slavery and a British suppression fleet operated 
in the Indian Ocean as well as the Atlantic, but state-sponsored “coolieism” from Asia 
and the “apprenticeships” of Africans in the Caribbean was allowed under the act.  The 
timeframe studied will be between 1808, when both nations passed their suppression 
laws, and 1862, when the United States, hampered by the Civil War, acceded to a treaty 
with Britain which granted the Royal Navy the right to search American-flagged vessels. 
France was a player in slave trade suppression as well.  Their policies vacillated, 
from outright hostility to the British, to cooperation with right to search treaties in 1831 
and 1833, to intransigence when they backed out of the Quintuple Treaty for the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade in 1842.  Despite their diplomatic agreements with the 
British, and language that referred to the slave trade as “evil, immoral and illegal,”4 the 
successive governments of Nineteenth Century France never forbid its citizens from 
dealing with slave traders; they preferred to allow their nationals to be involved indirectly 
in the slave trade rather than interfere directly with commercial freedom.5  For the 
                                                 
4
 Lawrence C. Jennings, “French Policy Toward Trading with African and Brazilian Slave 
Merchants, 1840-1853.”  The Journal of African History 17, No. 4 (1976): 515. 
5
 Jennings 522. 
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purpose of this thesis, French suppression is only studied in the context of British and 
American suppression efforts, where the interests of the French crossed with that of the 
Americans or the British. 
The history of the effort to suppress the slave trade is well-documented in Britain; 
a plethora of new British studies emerged recently corresponding to the bicentennial of 
the Act to Abolish the Slave Trade in 1808.  Yet the effort is almost unheard of in the 
United States.  Few college textbooks discuss the effort.  In his three volume Oxford 
History of the American People American historian Samuel Eliot Morison devotes one 
line to the effort.  High school teachers have yet to see textbooks that discuss the effort to 
suppress the trade and may not even know that such an effort occurred.  American 
students are taught that slavery ended with the Thirteenth Amendment and give tacit 
ignorance to any effort before the 1860s.  Despite the failure of the American historical 
community address the effort, the story of slave trade suppression, and the legal battles 
that accompanied it, is a story that demands attention. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 1808 – THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN  
SLAVE TRADE SUPPRESSION ACTS 
In the late eighteenth century the move to end the slave trade gained momentum.  
The new Enlightenment thinking of Europe had little room for social systems that set one 
person above another.  At the same time a wave of religious fervor swept across England 
and many middle class English, disenchanted with the Anglican Church, moved to the 
Protestant “Dissenter” churches: the Quakers, Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists 
and Unitarians.  These growing Evangelical denominations emphasized a more 
egalitarian interpretation of the Bible.  These groups also believed in an activist God, 
rewarding and punishing people according to their merit.  Nations were rewarded and 
punished as well, and they saw nineteenth century English society as corrupted by a 
number of interconnected evils, the greatest being slavery.6  God was punishing Great 
Britain by stripping her of her North American colonies and bringing repeated wars upon 
her.  Members of these groups were mocked as “Saints,” but soon their influence would 
end slavery in Britain and ultimately crush the slave trade around the world. 
  
                                                 
6
 Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: 
Britain’s Sixty-Year War Against the Atlantic Slave Trade.”  International Organization 53, 
No. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 634. 
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The British Abolition Act of 1808 
In fifteen years the “Saints” went from being a fringe element to the mainstream.  
William Wilberforce submitted his first bill to abolish the slave trade to Parliament in 
1791, declaring the trade to be contrary to “justice, humanity and sound policy.”  That 
bill was defeated, but Wilberforce opened each session of Parliament each year by 
submitting a slave trade abolition bill.  Despite opposition from those arguing that the 
slave trade was an economic boon to the country, by 1807 opinion had turned and 
Parliament voted to end the slave trade effective January 1 of the following year.7  British 
vessels were prohibited from carrying slaves anywhere in the world; violations of the 
prohibition carried a penalty of £100 ($7000) per slave captured, and the law offered 
generous bounties to officers making the capture.   Furthermore, slave imports into 
Britain’s West Indian colonies were banned, and foreign slave ships were barred from 
using British ports.8   
The slave trade was abolished in the spirit of the law, but the letter of the law did 
not provide enough punishment to stop all slavers.  As a misdemeanor, the fine for 
slaving was an amount of money that a slaver could easily make up on the next voyage 
though.  In March of 1811 Parliament upped the ante against the slavers, passing the 
Slave Trade Felony Bill, making a convicted slaver subject to seven years transportation 
                                                 
7
 The House of Lords voted 100-36, the House of Commons decided “without division.” 
8
 HC Deb, 16 March, 1807.  Hansards, vol. 9: 139-140. 
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in Australia.9  The addition of the felony bill gave the British a strong enough deterrent to 
force the slavers out from under the Union Jack. 
The American Abolition Act of 1808 
The American drive to end the slave trade reflected the efforts across the Atlantic.  
The Enlightenment thinking that brought about the ideals of the Declaration of 
Independence now demanded the abolition of slavery, to “rid the land of the free of the 
paradox of slavery.”10  But emancipation would not be easy.  Thomas Jefferson wrote 
that “As it is we have the wolf by the ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him 
go.  Justice is in one scale and self-preservation in the other.”11 
The American debate over the slave trade originated at the Constitutional 
Convention.  A proposal to end slave importation was introduced with the support of 
New England and the Middle states.12  Delegates from Georgia and South Carolina were 
intransigent, warning that they could not accept a plan that prohibited the slave trade.  
Their complaints and threats of secession induced a compromise which allowed slave 
imports until 1808. 
                                                 
9
 HC Deb, 5 March, 1811.  Hansards, vol. 19: 240. 
10
 DuBois, 197.  
11
 Letter, Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820. 
12
 George Mason of Virginia called the trade “infernal” and warned that the crime of slavery 
would bring the judgment of God upon the nation.  Luther Martin of Maryland said that the 
slave trade was “inconsistent with the principles of the revolution, and dishonourable to the 
American character.”  John Dickinson of Delaware declared that “Every principle of honor 
and safety demands the exclusion of slaves.”  DuBois, 53. 
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In 1800, eight years before the Constitutionally-mandated date, Congress passed 
an act prohibiting Americans from engaging in the slave trade,13 and in a matter of three 
months the United States Navy seized three slavers.14  But these efforts became less 
effective after 1800.  The end of the Quasi-War against France caused an uptick in trans-
Atlantic trade, including slaves.  At the same time, the Democratic-Republican President 
Thomas Jefferson made severe cuts in the size of the navy and increased cotton 
production in the South, driven by the introduction of the cotton gin and the purchase of 
Louisiana, also created higher demand for slaves.  The United States Navy was impotent 
to stop a tidal wave of slave imports.  By the middle of the first decade of the nineteenth 
century collectors in Southern ports complained of numerous “irregularities and mocking 
of the laws” in the courts,15 and getting no assistance from citizens.  Mr. Chew at New 
Orleans recommended that, “to put a stop to that traffic a naval force suitable to those 
waters is indispensable.”16  Another collector begged for just “one small cutter” to patrol 
the Gulf Coast.  The 1800 law simply had no teeth. 
Congress went to work on another slave trade prohibition bill as the 
Constitutionally-mandated year of 1808 approached.  They quickly settled on penalties 
for those involved in the slave trade: forfeiture of the vessel and cargo, a penalty of 
                                                 
13
 Annals of Congress, 6 Congress I Session, 686-700 
14
 Donald L. Cannay, Africa Squadron: The U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842-1861.  (Dulles, 
VA: Potomac Books, 2006): 3-4 
15
 DuBois, 114 
16
 House Doc., 16 Cong. 1 sess. III No.42, p.7, as cited in DuBois, 115 
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$1000 to $10,000, and five to ten years imprisonment.17  The more pressing concern was 
what to do with Africans liberated from captured American ships.  It was believed that 
free blacks could not mix in white dominated American society.  The federal government 
had no interest in the well-being of the Africans liberated off of the slave ships and, left 
to their own devices, most believed that Africans given freedom in America were likely 
to die or to become vagabonds.18  President Jefferson made deep cuts in the federal 
budget, shifting more responsibility to the states.  As for making the states responsible for 
liberated Africans the fear was that those Africans released in the South were likely to be 
arrested as vagabonds and sold into slavery anyway.19  Nevertheless, Congress did make 
the individual states responsible for disposing of liberated Africans.  On March 2, 1807 
Congress passed “An Act to prohibit the importation of Slaves into any port or place 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.”  On January 1, 1808, slave imports into the 
United States were banned.  The trade in slaves was also banned.20 
                                                 
17
 Statutes at Large, II, 427 
18
 Nathaniel Macon of Georgia stated, “If you give them their freedom and turn them loose, they 
must perish.”  Annals of Congress, 9 Congress II Session, 173. 
19
 Josiah Quincy III of Massachusetts queried, “What was to prevent the legislature of Georgia, 
after Congress have declared these people shall be free, considering them as vagabonds, and 
selling them for a term of years, or for life, to the highest bidder.”  He concluded, “If 
imported into the South, they will be slaves; if into the North, vagabonds.”  Annals of 
Congress, 9 Congress II Session, 176, 183. 
20
 Statutes at Large, II, 427-428.  The prohibition was on slave imports into the United States; 




In 1819 Congress passed another Act for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.  
This act directed the President to use armed cruisers to interdict slavers on the coast of 
Africa and the United States.  The bill was compromised, though, when Thomas Butler of 
Louisiana added the proviso that captured slavers be returned to the port from which they 
had cleared.  The proviso essentially allowed slavers clearing from the Southern ports to 
get trials in front of sympathetic juries.  As ships in Southern jurisdictions awaited trial 
many Africans simply “disappeared.”21  Attorney General Wirt found it necessary in 
1819 to remind collectors that “it is against public policy to dispense with prosecutions 
for violation of the law to prohibit the Slave trade.”22  One district attorney replied “It 
appears to be almost impossible to enforce the laws of the United States against offenders 
after the negroes have been landed in the state.”23  Another stated, “[W]hen vessels 
engaged in the slave trade have been detained by the American cruisers, and sent into the 
slave-holding states, there appears at once a difficulty in securing the freedom to these 
captives which the laws of the United States have decreed for them.”24  Representative 
Quincy’s assertion, that freed Africans landed in the South would become slaves anyway, 
was proving correct. 
                                                 
21
 Annals of Cong.,15 Cong., 2 sess., p.1430 
22
 DuBois, 127 
23
 DuBois, 127 
24
 DuBois, 127 
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Congress passed another Slave Trade Act on March 15, 1820, defining the slave 
trade as piracy and making the crime punishable by death.25  Legislators hoped that new 
teeth would help in enforcing the law, but the potential of the death penalty turned many 
juries away from guilty verdicts instead.26  Furthermore, there were still no provisions to 
protect “freed” Africans who were left to the discretion of the state of the court that freed 
them. 
In the first quarter of the 1800s Great Britain and the United States both passed 
laws prohibiting the slave trade.  The spirit of the law was clear but the letter of the 
original law had few teeth and the legislatures of the two countries had to reformulate 
their laws to make them more effective.  The United States Congress hoped that its 
citizens would be dissuaded from engaging in the trade by the potential of a conviction 
for piracy and the application of the death penalty.  It had little power to police the trade 
and apprehend alleged “pirates” though and under the Constitution alleged lawbreakers 
were innocent until proven guilty; as the Charleston Mercury asserted: “Better a hundred 
criminals go free than one innocent be found guilty.”27  The British eventually made 
slaving punishable by seven years transportation in Australia.  Because they had a large 
navy they used the power of their navy casting a broad net in its sweep of slavers.  
                                                 
25
 Statutes at Large, III. 600-1 
26
 When asked why he had not yet been hanged Captain Charles G. Cox of the Emperor stated 
that “No jury in the United States would hang him for bringing negroes in the United States 
as an evidence of it he said they bailed him for four hundred dollars.  Testimony from United 
States v. the Schooner Emperor as cited in Dorothy Dodd, “The Schooner Emperor: An 
Incident of the Illegal Slave Trade in Florida.”  The Florida Historical Quarterly 13, No. 3 
(Jan. 1935): 119. 
27
 Howard, 38 
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Neither country could stop the slave trade in its entirety on its own.  As long as any other 
country allowed the trade slavers could continue their work claiming the immunity of that 
flag.  Cooperation was paramount, but and when the British sought to have the 
Americans join them in their crusade, the latter made it clear that they were not interested 
whatsoever.  The British did little to help their diplomatic cause. 
17 
 
CHAPTER THREE: IMPRESSMENT - SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME?  
At the same time that the United States and Great Britain were passing legislation 
to close the trans-Atlantic slave trade another issue was arising between the two 
countries.  By 1800 the war between Napoleon and Great Britain had devolved into a 
stalemate.  In an effort to gain an advantage, both sides targeted neutral American 
shipping on the high seas.  Originally, warships from both sides stopped American ships, 
boarded and inspected their cargoes, and redirected the ships to their own ports, but as the 
war dragged on the British resorted to impressment to man the ships of their navy.  “Press 
gangs” dispersed throughout the port cities of Britain and her colonies, British merchant 
ships were stopped on the high seas, and sailors were “pressed” onto warships.  More 
often than not Americans were caught in the sweep as well.  The United States protested 
the actions, referencing freedom of the seas as codified in the Law of Nations. 
The Development of Maritime International Law 
The concept of the “Law of Nations,”28 that sovereign states are governed by a 
common set of laws, originated with St. Augustine and gained prominence in the 
sixteenth century through the writings of Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel.  By the 
nineteenth century most European states agreed to bind themselves to that system.  With 
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no judge to hold a state to its obligations, the Law of Nations was essentially a set of 
“rules” by which each state “ought” to live.  Laws governing state actions were generally 
based upon international conventions to which other major states were willing to bind 
themselves; the more states that acceded to a convention, the more it became codified as 
international law.  States that refused to join these conventions found themselves isolated 
from the rest of the civilized world. 
The legal issue that the British and Americans ultimately battled over was 
“Freedom of the Seas,” a concept that originated with Hugo Grotius in the fifteenth 
century.  His book Mare liberum was a response to a papal edict granting Spain and 
Portugal sovereignty over the entirety of the oceans.  Grotius argued that the oceans were 
the common good of all mankind and could not, by their nature, be occupied any more 
than the sky could be occupied.  It was repugnant to the law of nature, therefore, for the 
pope to give to the Spanish and the Portuguese the right to possess the sea as their private 
property.  Rather, every nation had the right to use the ocean as a highway for 
commerce.29  Those countries opposed to the Spanish and Portuguese used Grotius to 
justify expanding their own maritime footprint. 
Grotius’s tract was not immediately agreed upon by all nations, though.  The 
loudest protest against freedom of the seas came from England.  John Selden’s Mare 
clausum (1635) argued that the law of nature shows that the seas are not common to all 
mankind, but can be subject to the jurisdiction and the domain of individuals just as the 
land can.  Taking possession of the oceans only required a fleet of warships.  From this 
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premise Selden argued that there was an Oceanus Britannicus, the waters around the 
British Isles, westward to North America and north to Scandinavia which the British were 
allowed to dominate.30  This idea was supported by Charles Molloy in his book, de Iure 
Maritimo et Navali: or, a Treatise of Affairs Maritime, and of Commerce (1676).  
According to Molloy, the sea, like the land, needed the protection of governments, and 
therefore needed to be apportioned among States as they are able to rule, govern and 
defend them.  God left it to the fleets to decide over the Empire of the World.  Molloy 
adds that the seas are common to all and navigation upon them is open to all, but those 
upon the sea should not be “without Protection or government of some Prince or 
Republick.”31  Although the British later renounced these ideas politically, they remained 
in the national subconscious for as long as their navy was the Mistress of the Seas.  It is 
not a stretch of the imagination to see that the right to search the ships of other states is 
based upon the ideas of Molloy.  The humanitarian act of searching the ships of alleged 
slavers in the nineteenth century has its roots in the writings of Molloy. 
Impressment and the Violation of American Neutral Rights  
Violations of American shipping were the result of the ongoing war between 
Britain and Revolutionary France.  In fact the violations of American neutral shipping 
began in the 1790s, not with the British, but with the French.  The violation of American 
neutral rights led the United States and France to a “Quasi-War” that lasted until 1800.  
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Following that peace, American shippers found larger problems with a much larger 
antagonist.   
The British were likewise engaged in stopping neutral American shipping, 
searching their ships and seizing their cargoes.  It was not long before the British were 
stopping and searching American ships for another reason.  To help man the Royal Navy 
British sea captains resorted to impressing sailors.  The low pay and the very high 
probability of death at sea led to the desertion of many British sailors to the American 
merchant marine or the American navy.  The British often tried to recapture these 
deserters by stopping and searching American ships upon which they might have taken 
shelter.  The crew of the American merchantman would be mustered, and the officers 
allowed to inspect them.  Those that the British knew were deserters were taken, along 
with those they suspected were British deserters, and those that they thought could 
contribute to the running of their ship, whether British or not.  The impressed men were 
then taken on board the Briton, flogged, and forced into labor. 
In 1806 impressment turned deadly.  The HMS Leander, commanded by Captain 
Henry Whitby, stood off of New York routinely detaining American ships and 
impressing sailors.  When the American merchantman Richard refused to heave to and be 
inspected, the Leander put a shot into the ship.  The ball decapitated the Richard’s 
helmsman, John Pierce.  The public outcry in New York was immediate and intense.  It 
was further intensified when Whitby was acquitted by a British court martial, then 
announced that he would “be off of Sandy Hook again in a few months to kill another 
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John Pierce.”32  American protests were largely ignored by the British; it was the duty of 
the Royal Navy, a la Charles Malloy, to offer the seas protection from the French. 
The Chesapeake Incident 
The issue of impressment climaxed with the Chesapeake incident.  When three 
French cruisers took shelter in Chesapeake Bay in May 1807, a British naval squadron 
took up positions along the American coast waiting for them to put to sea again.  While 
the ships waited a number of British sailors found their way to shore.  Upon hearing of 
the desertions the British Foreign Office warned the United States government not to 
enlist any British subjects, going as far as providing a list of their names. 
On June 22 the USS Chesapeake, commanded by Commodore James Barron, left 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, for a cruise of the Mediterranean Sea.  Ten miles off of the 
coast, the ship met the 56-gun HMS Leopard, commanded by Captain Salusbury Price 
Humphreys.  The Briton sent a lieutenant to the Chesapeake with a letter stating their 
belief that the Americans had recruited five deserters from the HMS Halifax, listing them 
by name and asked for the right to search the ship for deserters.  He offered Barron the 
reciprocal right to search his ship for possible American deserters.  When asked about 
deserters among his crew, Barron stated that he did not know of any.  When asked if he 
would muster his crew for inspection Barron refused and escorted the lieutenant to the 
gangway. 
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When the lieutenant was safely on board the Leopard, Captain Humphreys hailed 
the Chesapeake, then fired a shot across its bow.  He then fired a full broadside into the 
Chesapeake.  Three American sailors were killed and eighteen wounded in the barrage, 
including Barron who took a splinter to the leg.  With considerable damage done to the 
ship, Barron struck his colors.  A British detachment boarded the Chesapeake and 
mustered the crew.  The crew was lined-up and inspected, then four sailors were clapped 
in irons and transferred to the Leopard.  One of the men taken from the Chesapeake was 
a British sailor that had deserted from the Halifax; he was hanged after being returned to 
his ship.  The three others were impressed Americans that had deserted from HMS 
Melampus; they were returned to the ship and sentenced to five hundred lashes.33 
The court-martial that followed found that Commodore Barron: 
…did, on the probability of engagement, neglect to clear his ship for action: and 
did fail to encourage in his own person, his inferior officers and men to fight 
courageously: and did not do his utmost to take or destroy the aforesaid vessel of 
war the Leopard, which vessel it was his duty to encounter.34 
He was suspended from command for five years, without pay or other 
emoluments.35  This was not unprecedented; when a British cruiser stopped the USS 
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Baltimore in 1798 and impressed five sailors President John Adams was compelled to 
remove the ship’s captain from command.36  Barron’s court martial made it clear to naval 
captains that the proper response to British attempts to force a visit and search of 
American vessels was with force.  In June 1810, Secretary of Navy Paul Hamilton 
reaffirmed the call for Americans to meet British force with force, stating:  
The inhumane and dastardly attack on our Frigate Chesapeake – an outrage which 
prostrated the flag of our Country and has imposed on the American people cause 
of ceaseless mourning…what has been perpetrated may again be attempted.  It is 
therefore our duty to be prepared and determined to at every hazard to vindicate 
the injured honor of the Navy and revive the drooping Spirit of the Nation.37 
Naval officers bemoaned missing the opportunity to even the score against the British, for 
the sailors’ code of honor prompted them to remember past indignities.38  Retired 
Commodore Joshua Barney offered his services to Jefferson.  An opportunity for 
vindication did come on June 26, 1810, in the Caribbean, when HMS Moselle fired two 
shots at the USS Vixen.  The Vixen’s captain did not reply in kind.  Captain Stephen 
Decatur lamented that the Vixen missed a “glorious opportunity to cancel the blot 
underneath which our flag suffers.”39  Decatur would get his opportunity a few years 
later. 
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Commodore John Rodgers was determined to cancel the blot immediately.  When 
word reached Rodgers in New York in the spring of 1811 that several American 
merchant ships had been interdicted by the HMS Guerrière and a number of Americans 
impressed, he set out in the 44-gun President to find the guilty party.  On May 16 he 
made “strange sail,” and, suspecting that it was the Guerrière, gave pursuit.  That evening 
the two ships stood next to each other and exchanged a series of broadsides.  The Briton 
was seriously damaged.  The next morning Rodgers discovered that it was not the 
Guerrière with whom he exchanged fire, but the smaller twenty-gun corvette Little Belt.40  
Rodgers’s reaction to British provocation was with force.  There was no apology for the 
United States. 
The War of 1812 
The following year the United States Congress voted to go to war against Great 
Britain. In his war message President Madison charged that: 
British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag 
on the great highway of nations, and seizing and carrying off persons sailing 
under it, not in the exercise of a belligerent right found in the law of nations 
against an enemy but as a municipal prerogative over British subjects.  British 
jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels in a situation where no laws can 
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operate but the law of nations and the laws of the country to which the vessel 
belongs….41 
He added that “thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law and of 
their national flag, have been torn from their country and everything dear to them.”  For 
Madison and the Congress that voted for his recommendation the War of 1812 was for 
“Freedom of the Seas.” 
On October 9, 1812, Stephen Decatur, now captain of the 44-gun heavy frigate 
United States, fell upon the HMS Macedonian.  Seeing the Stars and Stripes atop the 
opposing frigate, impressed American sailors on board the Macedonian requested to be 
sent below rather than fight their countrymen.  The captain, John Surinam Carden 
refused, threatening to kill any of the impressed Americans that did not do their duty.42  
Within a few hours the United States defeated the Macedonian; forty-three sailors on the 
Macedonian were killed, three of them impressed Americans.43  It was an atrocity for 
impressed Americans to be made to fight for the British against the French in a war in 
which they wanted no part.  Now the British were forcing them to fight against their own 
countrymen. 
Some have suggested that American protests against a proposal that of British 
cruisers be allowed to stop and search American merchant ships was unreasonable.  This 
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is not true in the least.  The American experience with British cruisers stopping and 
searching American ships, a violation of the law of nations, had caused nothing but 
anguish.  The impressment, forced labor, and the unnecessary killing of their countrymen 
at the hands of the British would long remain in the minds of Americans.  It is believed 
that as many as 6,500 American sailors were impressed by the British.44  The memory of 
impressment was in the minds of Americans, particularly the veterans of 1812 that were 
charged with the protection of her citizens.  The British suggestion that their warships be 
allowed to stop and search American merchant vessels found a very cold reception in the 
United States.  Whether their ships were carrying cargo that was legitimate or not, 
allowing British cruisers to stop American ships was anathema: the Right to Search 
equaled the Right to Impress and the Right to Enslave.  Opposition to impressment drove 
the resistance to stopping and searching of American ships on the high seas. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SEARCHING FOR THE RIGHT TO SEARCH 
With the implementation of the British suppression laws the fear of many in 
Parliament proved true.  As the Union Jack disappeared from the Atlantic Ocean, the 
slave trade started falling under the flags of other countries.  British courts hamstrung the 
suppression efforts of its own country, ruling that the Law of Nations did not allow the 
Royal Navy to seize the ships of other countries even if they were known to be slavers.  
The British responded by negotiating bilateral treaties with other maritime powers, 
allowing each signatory the “Reciprocal Right to Search,” that allowed each to search the 
ships of the other.  There were a few countries that resisted Britain’s demands, but with 
the recent memory of impressment the United States did. 
The Napoleonic Wars and the Right to Search 
During its wars with Napoleon the British seized their own slavers, along with 
those of their belligerents, the French and Spanish.  In 1808 the American-flagged and 
therefore neutral Amedie was captured trafficking slaves from Africa to the Spanish 
colonies in America.  The British court ruled that, since the United States had abolished 
the slave trade, the ship and her cargo had to be “condemned” (confiscated).45  The 
Amedie decision became the precedent for future captures of slavers, with the British 
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condemning slavers from the United States and other countries that had abolished the 
slave trade. 
The courts ruled that this regulation was not true of ships flying the flag of a 
nation that had not abolished the slave trade.  In September 1810 the Diana, a Swedish 
ship was seized and condemned by the British Vice Admiralty Court in Sierra Leone.  
When the case was appealed the British courts released the Diana, Sir William Scott 
ruling “the Lords of Appeal did not set themselves up to be the legislators of the whole 
world, or to presume in any manner to interfere with the commercial regulations of other 
states.”  Because the Swedes had not abolished the slave trade, the British had no right to 
interfere with their slavers.46 
What would happen if a ship were captured that purported to be of a nation that 
allowed slave trade but was suspected of being of a state that had abolished it?  The 
Fortuna was first owned by an American but sold to a Portuguese citizen for the purpose 
of gaining the right to use the flag of Portugal, a nation that had not abolished the slave 
trade.  It was seized in 1811 and inspection by the British courts showed that Fortuna 
was a slaver, liable to condemnation unless it could be proven that the slave trade was 
legal according to the laws of the flag-state, in this case Portugal.  “If the ship should 
therefore turn out to be an American so actually employed,” the court stated, “…the case 
of the Amedie will bind the conscience of this court to pronounce a sentence of 
confiscation.”47  Upon further evidence the court ruled that the Fortuna was an 
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American, not Portuguese, and confiscated the ship.  The case indicated that the British 
were willing to go to great lengths to determine the nationality of a ship and that they 
would show a healthy amount of skepticism when the situation demanded it. 
When the Napoleonic Wars ended the French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch 
prepared to restart the slave trade.  Without war as a pretext the British could no longer 
stop slavers under those flags unless it was illegal under the Law of Nations.  That would 
require a certain amount of diplomacy and cajoling.  During the Congress of Vienna in 
1815 the British had an opportunity to make their worldwide anti-slave trade crusade a 
reality.  Lord Castlereagh lobbied the other Great Powers to equate slave trade with 
piracy; as pirates, slave traders would not be allowed the protection of their flag and 
could be met with deadly force on the high seas.  After much negotiating the other states 
agreed to “The Vienna Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade”:  
considering the universal abolition of the slave trade as a measure particularly 
worthy of their attention, conformable to the spirit of the times and to the 
generous principles of their august Sovereigns, they are animated with a sincere 
desire of concurring in the most prompt and effectual execution of this measure 
by all the means at their disposal, and of acting in the employment of these means 
with all the zeal and perseverance which is due to so great and noble a cause.48 
It soon became clear that not everyone was on board with the goal of suppressing the 
slave trade. 
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The Le Louis Case and the Right to Search 
The Vienna Declaration was almost immediately challenged in the Le Louis case 
in 1817.  The French slaver Le Louis was captured by the British cruiser Queen Charlotte 
after the crew of the slaver resisted violently, killing twelve British seamen.  The ship 
was condemned by the Vice Admiralty Court in Sierra Leone under the 1815 Vienna 
Declaration.  On an appeal to the High Court of the Admiralty, Sir William Scott ruled 
that the right to visit and search by a royal warship did not exist in peacetime, except in 
the case of piracy, but because the slave trade was not piracy under the Law of Nations, 
nor had the French declared the slave trade to be piracy,  “No authority can be found 
which gives any right of visitation or interruption over the vessels of navigation of other 
states, on the high seas except what the right of war gives to belligerents against 
neutrals.”  Scott added, “A nation is not justified in assuming rights that do not belong to 
her merely because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose; nor in setting out 
upon a moral crusade of converting other nations by acts of unlawful force.”  He 
completed his judgment by stating that no government could “force the way to liberation 
of Africa by trampling on the independence of the other states of Europe.”49  Hence the 
slave suppression section of the Vienna Congress was nullified and the precedence of the 
Amedie case was overturned.  The LeLouis case set a precedent that future British courts 
found difficult to skirt. 
The Le Louis case made it clear that other countries were stating empty promises 
at Vienna and that they would not compromise their sovereignty, allowing their ships to 
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be stopped, searched and seized by the British on the high seas.  The British were also 
rebuffed in their own courts.  Their only option was to obtain bilateral treaties with 
individual countries willing to aid in the suppression of the slave trade.  In 1817 they 
negotiated a treaty with Spain in which the latter would abolish the trade and, to aid in the 
effort, both sides agreed to a reciprocal right to search in which warships from one 
country could search ships flying the flag of the other if they were suspected of engaging 
in the slave trade.  Trials for those accused of slaving would take place in a Court of 
Mixed Commission in either Freetown or Havana.  As encouragement to the Spanish to 
sign the treaty the British included a “subsidy” of £400,000 ($28 million).50  Portugal 
signed a similar arrangement with Britain during the same year and the Dutch in 1818.51  
For all intents and purposes, the “reciprocal” right to search meant the right of British 
cruisers to search the vessels of the other signatories, since the British were the only state 
that could expend its naval resources to engage in such a task. 
Efforts to draw the French into the arrangement were rebuffed.  British proposals 
for the reciprocal right to search and declaring the slave trade to be piracy were rejected 
at the Congress at Aix-la-Chappelle and at the Congress of Verona.52  The Duke of 
Richelieu stated that “the offer of reciprocity would be illusory; and that disputes must 
inevitably rise from the abuse of that right, which would prove more prejudicial to the 
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interests of the two governments than the commerce they desire to suppress.”53  The 
French were content to suppress the slave trade carried out under its own flag as they had 
since 1815, without British interference. 
The United States and the Right to Search 
The ten year effort to draw the United States into a convention was unfruitful as 
well.  In 1814 the United States and Great Britain met in Ghent, Belgium to make peace 
after the War of 1812.  In Article Ten of the Ghent Treaty both sides agreed that: 
Whereas the Traffic in Slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity 
and Justice, and whereas both His Majesty’s government and the United States 
are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby 
agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to 
accomplish so desired an object.54   
But the “best endeavors” of the United States would ultimately prove to be like the 
“sincere desire” of the Europeans after the Congress of Vienna.  What was left out of the 
treaty was a British agreement to end the practice of impressing American sailors into the 
Royal Navy.  The British reasoned that, with the end of the war against Napoleon they no 
longer had reason to impress American sailors.  Quizzically, there was no strong push by 
American negotiators to include that prohibition.  Stopping and searching American ships 
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by the Royal Navy would soon come into play again with the memory of impressment 
still in the forefront of American memories. 
When the British asked the United States to join in a reciprocal right to search 
agreement, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams responded with the American 
perspective: the British treaty with Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands demanded Mixed 
Courts in their colonies but the United States had no colonies in Africa or Latin America.  
Adams further stated a constitutional problem with American submission to a Mixed 
Court, carrying out penal statutes beyond the territories of the United States, consisting 
partly of foreign judges not subject to impeachment for corruption, and deciding on 
statutes against the persons, property and reputations of American citizens without the 
possibility of an appeal.  Furthermore, slaves delivered to the United States could not be 
guaranteed the protection of the federal government, rather they would become subject to 
the laws of the state in which they were released.  Alluding to the impressment of 
American sailors by the British that led to the War of 1812, Adams warned that “the 
admission of a right in the officers of foreign ships of war to enter and search the vessels 
of the United States in time of peace under any circumstances whatever would meet with 
universal repugnance in the public opinion of this country.”55  When asked if there was 
any worse evil than the slave trade Adams replied that it would be a much worse evil if 
the United States Government should allow any vessel flying the Stars and Stripes to be 
stopped and examined by a British cruiser, for that would be to make slaves of the whole 
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American people.56  Americans, still stinging from the recent war fought over British 
searches of American ships, were now being asked to give the British that right all over 
again. 
The British pressed the United States again in 1823, stating that only effective 
way of suppressing the slave trade was with a reciprocal right to search.  Adams one-
upped the British stating that the United States Act of 1820 declared the slave trade to be 
piracy, punishable by death, and noted that nothing in British law went so far as those of 
the United States.57  Adams stated the hope of his government that the British, along with 
the rest of the world, would declare the slave trade to be piracy, therefore stripping the 
offender of any nationality, allowing him to be tried in the court of any nation, and 
punishable by death. 
The following year the British approached the United States again proposing the 
right to search.  This time Adams replied that 
his government had an insuperable objection to its extension by treaty, lest it 
might lead to consequences still more injurious to the United States.  That the 
proposed extension would operate, in time of peace, and derive its sanction from 
compact, produced no inducements to its adoption.  On the contrary, they formed 
strong objections to it… If the freedom of the seas was abridged by compact for 
any new purpose, the example might lead to other changes.  And if the operation 
of the right to search were extended to a time of peace as well as war, a new 
system would be commenced for the dominion of the seas, which might 
eventually, especially by the abuses to which it might lead, confound all 
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distinctions of time and of circumstances, of peace and of war, and of right 
applicable to each state.58 
Once again the United States remained leery of giving the British the right to search, no 
matter how altruistic the cause. 
In March of 1824 British and American negotiators again attempted to 
compromise their differences.  The resulting convention called for the British to 
recognize slave trading to be piracy, punishable by death, with an eye toward the 
international community making slave trade piracy under the Law of Nations.  In return 
the United States would agree to a very limited right to search by armed cruisers of each 
nation off of the coast of Africa, America and the West Indies, and to accused slavers 
being tried in the courts of their own country.  On April 30 the treaty was sent to the 
Senate for ratification.  The Senate made a number of amendments to the treaty, 
excluding “America” from the areas where British cruisers had the right to search, and 
allowing each party the opportunity to renounce the treaty with six-month’s notice.  The 
amended version of the treaty passed the Senate, but the changes were too much for the 
British cabinet who allowed the convention to die.59 
British hopes for any reciprocal right to search agreement with the United States 
were dashed the following year.  On December 6, 1825 HMS Redwing fired into the 
Boston-based Pharos while at anchor in the port of Freetown, Sierra Leone.  Two sailors 
were taken off of the American and pressed into service for the British.  After American 
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protests one of the sailors was released.  The British claimed the other to be a subject of 
queen and refused to release him.60  With a return to violations of the sovereignty of the 
American flag, a reciprocal right to search agreement was a dead letter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ATLANTIC SHELL GAME - ELUDING  
THE SUPPRESSION FLEET 
Legal issues plagued the British anti-slave trade crusade.  The Anti-Slave Trade 
Treaties signed by the British with the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch allowed naval 
personnel from each nation to board the ships of another, but did not determine the 
penalty for slaving; convicted slavers were punished under their own national laws.  
Seven years transportation in Australia was a stiff penalty, but thousands of British 
subjects still involved in the slave trade did not go away overnight.  With a well-
established network of trade facilities on the African coast, many British slavers 
continued in their previous employment under the flags of other nations.  “Very few real 
Spanish ships are employed,” a British commissioner reported concerning the slave trade, 
“the great masses of vessels are under the Spanish flag… several are supposed to belong 
to British merchants.”61  Most of the Spanish and Portuguese slavers involved in the trade 
sailed British-built ships, used British capital, received credit from British banks, and 
were insured by British insurance companies.  Lord Castlereagh testified before to the 
House of Commons in 1818, “It would be a great error to believe that the reproach of 
carrying on the slave trade illegally belonged to other countries…British subjects are 
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indirectly and largely involved.”62  A Spanish merchant operating in London, accused of 
supplying goods to slave traders, testified to a British court, “If merchants in this country 
would not accept bills drawn by slave traders… the trade could not be carried out at 
all.”63  Thus began the “Atlantic Shell Game.” 
The Technicalities of Slave Trade Suppression 
Under all three suppression treaties suspected vessels were tried by a Court of 
Mixed Commission.  Ships found to be illegally transporting slaves would be 
condemned, their crews turned over to the authorities of their own nation, and their 
human cargo granted their freedom.  The British often had trouble before the Mixed 
Courts.  The British judge often had to play the role of prosecutor against foreign judges 
that were predisposed to rule in favor of their own countrymen, even when the evidence 
was undeniable.64  British captains were further hampered by the overly technical rules 
written into the treaties.  The 1817 treaties stipulated that a ship could only be seized if 
there were captives actually on board, so slavers often simply threw their cargo overboard 
before a navy vessel could board them.65 
To help with the problem of capturing empty slavers the British negotiated a new 
treaty with Spain in 1822 inserting an “Explanatory Article” stating that a vessel could be 
condemned if there was “clear and undeniable proof that slaves had been on board for the 
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purpose of illegal traffic in the particular voyage in which the vessel was captured.”66  
Again, what was undeniable proof to British judges was easily deniable to the Spanish or 
the Portuguese.  Additional teeth were put into the cause with “Equipment Clauses” 
which made the possession of specific equipment related to the slave trade prima facie 
grounds for condemnation. 67  New conventions were also signed with Denmark and 
Sweden, and the new American republics of Haiti, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Texas conditional on their taking appropriate steps against the 
slave trade, including acceding to the Right to Search.68  The drive to codify the right to 
search into international law was gaining steam.  A few major powers still held out. 
In the early 1840s more than one-quarter of the entire British Navy stood off the 
coasts of West Africa, Brazil, and Cuba, invoking the new “Equipment Clauses.”  
Between 1839 and 1845 three hundred forty-six ships were adjudicated in the British 
Vice Admiralty and Mixed Courts at Sierra Leone, two hundred eighty having been 
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captured before any slaves could be loaded.69  It is apparent that the British were doing 
everything within the letter of the law to suppress the trade even when others were not. 
Slaving Under the Stars and Stripes 
Although they had laws making the slave trade illegal, the United States had no 
naval vessels committed to the African coast.  Nor was there a treaty with the British.  An 
1820 report by a British officer stated that in spite of American laws, “American vessels, 
American subjects, and American capital, are unquestionably engaged in the trade, 
though under other colours and in disguise.”70  In 1823 the commander of the American 
sloop-of-war Cyane reported ten searches within only a few days, adding “Although they 
are evidently owned by Americans, they are so completely covered in Spanish papers that 
it is impossible to condemn them.”71  Perhaps understanding the situation on the African 
coast too well Secretary of Navy Samuel Southard stated in 1824, “None of these, or any 
other of our public ships have found vessels engaging in the slave trade, under the flag of 
the United States, and in such circumstances as to justify their being seized and sent for 
adjudication.  And, although it is known that the trade still exists, as it is seldom, if ever, 
carried on under our own flag, it is impossible, with the existing regulations and 
instructions, to afford very efficient in exterminating it.”72  He went on to state that the 
only possible way to attack the problem was “by the combined effort of the maritime 
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nations, each yielding to the others the facilities necessary to detect the traffic under its 
own flag.”73  In the 1820s most Americans had no interest in any type of combined effort 
with the British. 
American animus toward the British is seen in the Monroe Doctrine.  As Spanish 
power receded in the Americas the people of Central and South America raised their own 
banners of independence.  In the early 1820s a movement was set afoot by the “Holy 
Alliance” of Spain, Russia, Prussia and Austria to forcibly return the Latin Americans to 
their legitimate leaders.  Great Britain and the United States both opposed the move, but 
when British Foreign Secretary George Canning proposed a Joint Declaration to be 
issued by both governments, President James Monroe replied that “he was averse to 
taking any course that should have the appearance of taking a position subordinate to that 
of Great Britain,” that “It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our 
principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of 
the British man-of-war.”74  Instead the President unilaterally issued the Monroe Doctrine, 
stating that the United States would stand in the way of any attempts to “extend their 
system to any portion of this hemisphere.”  The American government made it clear that 
they were standing on their own principles without subjecting themselves to an outside 
force, no matter how common were their intentions.  On the subject of the slave trade the 
United States would never take their place in a cock-boat being pulled behind a British 
man-of-war, no matter how common were their intentions. 
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In the same year the Supreme Court doubled back on the British in the Antelope 
case.  Chief Justice Marshall ruled, like Sir William Scott before him, that all nations 
have equal access to the high seas, and that the slave trade must be allowed, unless all 
nations abolish it, “as no nation can proscribe a rule for others, none can make a law of 
nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden 
it.”  Marshall denied that the slave trade could be considered piracy, therefore: 
If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is almost superfluous 
to say in this Court, that the right of bringing in for adjudication in times of peace, 
even when the vessel belongs to a nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot 
exist.  The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another; and the course 
of the American government on the subject of the visitation and search would 
decide any case in which that right had been exercised by an American cruiser, on 
the vessel of a foreign nation, not violating our municipal laws, against the 
captors.75 
Since the slave trade was neither piracy, nor a violation of international law a ship could 
not be subject to condemnation, even if its own government had prohibited the trade.  
According to the precedence established in the Antelope case, the United States would 
not recognize a capture by any foreign nation on the high seas. 
As the Explanatory Articles of 1822 and the Equipment Articles of 1835 were 
crushing the Portuguese and Spanish slave trading enterprises, American-flagged ships 
continued passing through the British suppression fleet unmolested.  By the mid-1830s 
American ships covered by the Spanish flag and Spanish papers started to disappear from 
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the African coast, while ships with English names started arriving, cruising under the 
American flag.  The shell game continued. 
The British now took a stronger line towards visiting American ships.  In 
December, 1838 the Mary Ann Cassard was detained by HMS Brisk in the Gallinas River 
on suspicion of slaving.  The American “master,” John Bacon, headed a crew of 
Spaniards and carried eight passengers, one being Juan Barba who was authorized by the 
owners of the ship to “depose both the vessel and the cargo as he might think proper.”76  
A study of the Mary Ann Cassard’s papers showed that: 
The multiplication of powers of attorney on this case is inexplicable.  Gilbert 
Cassard of Baltimore, appoints Edgar Montell, residing in the same place, as his 
attorney; and the letter, on the same day, names substitutes to act for him, 
although he was present at Matanzas when his substitutes sold the Mary Ann 
Cassard to Moncada.  Then the latter appoints Barba to sell his newly-purchased 
property; and thus, in less than two months, the Mary Ann Cassard passed 
through the hands of five different persons.77 
Despite the irregularities, the American consul in Matanzas was satisfied that the Mary 
Ann Cassard was an American vessel, properly navigated according to the laws of the 
United States, and issued a clearance certificate for the schooner which made its voyage 
to Africa under the American flag.  Nevertheless the ship was seized as Spanish property 
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used in a slave trading enterprise in violation of the Spanish Anti-Slave Treaty and sent it 
to the Anglo-Spanish Mixed Court in Sierra Leone; the court refused to hear the case, 
though, because the ship was under the American flag and commanded by an American 
citizen when seized:  
The captor himself has declared that the Mary Ann Cassard was “under American 
colours” at the time of her capture; and the papers of the vessel show that she was 
acknowledged to be an undoubtedly American vessel by the Spanish authorities at 
Matanzas, and by the Consular Agent of the United States at that port.78 
By these facts the Mixed Court determined that, even if the ship was prima facie a slaver, 
they had no jurisdiction over the vessel.  Upon hearing the report of the Mixed Court 
concerning the Mary Ann Cassard Viscount Palmerston took this case to his 
government’s lawyers who concluded: 
[T]he circumstances disclosed in the papers of that vessel, sufficiently show that 
the Mary Ann Cassard, at the time of her detention, was Spanish, and not 
American property, and that the commissioners would have been justified in 
condemning her under the Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade.79 
The Royal Navy found similar cases of Spanish ventures disguised as Americans.  
In January, 1839, HMS Saracen, commanded by Lieutenant Hill, visited the Florida 
anchored off of Gallinas, under American colors, but suspected of being Spanish.  Except 
for the American owner-master, David Williamson, everything on board gave the 
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indication that the enterprise was Spanish.  Before Hill left the ship Williamson stated 
that the registry in his name was a forgery and that he feared for his life and sought 
protection from his all-Spanish crew.  He surrendered the ship to the British, and a search 
turned-up equipment for the slave trade.  The ship was seized and sent to Sierra Leone.  
Again, the Mixed Court refused to hear the case because the ship was seized while under 
an American master and flying the American flag.  When Williamson refused to take the 
vessel to sea with the Spanish crew the ship was broken up.80 
Between January and March 1839 the British seized five more American-flagged 
vessels on suspicion of being Spanish property: the Hazard, Mary Cushing, Eagle, Clara, 
and Traveller.  In each case the ships were built in Baltimore, bought by an American, 
then sailed to Havana and sold to a Spanish citizen in Cuba.  An American was then 
given nominal command of the vessel as “Captain of the Flag,” while the voyage was 
actually under the direction of a Spanish “supercargo” who commanded the Spanish 
crew.  The clearance certificate was the proverbial “golden ticket,” issued by the 
American consul-general, that verified that the ship was American and being properly 
navigated under the laws of the United States.   
With an American master and American clearance papers a ship had the right to 
fly the American flag.  A ship flying the American flag, British courts continually 
reaffirmed, could not be visited by a British cruisers.  Lieutenant Hill of HMS Saracen 
complained that “The Treaty between England and Spain is now defeated by the 
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American flag and papers from the Havana, bearing the signature of Mr. Smith, the Vice-
Consul of the United States.”81  H.W. Macaulay added that “A remedy for such a state of 
things must soon be applied, either by the government of the United States, or by the 
Governments who will not consent to see the labours of thirty years absolutely thrown 
away, and rendered altogether useless and inconsequential, by the obstinate jealousy of 
one commercial Power.”82  If the Americans were unable to enforce their own laws, the 
remedy was the Right to Search. 
Following the seizure of Hazard, as with the many seizures before, Lord 
Palmerston sent a message to British ambassador to the United States, Mr. Fox: 
You will, in a note to the United States Government, give the substance of the 
information contained in the enclosed papers; and you will urge that government 
to take measures for putting an end to the abuse of its flag for purposes of the 
slave trade, of which the case of the schooner Hazard furnishes so flagrant an 
instance.83 
If the United States continued balking at taking action, Palmerston was prepared to take 
the issue to American’s front door. 
The British commissioners to the Mixed Court in Sierra Leone went so far as to 
implicate the Americans of conspiring with the slave traders, writing to Viscount 
                                                 
81
 Lieutenant Hill to Rear-Admiral Elliot, Her Majesty’s Brig Saracen, Sierra Leone, January 28, 
1839. Correspondence on Vessels under the Flag of the United States: 22. 
82
 Report explanatory of the decision pronounced in the Case of the American schooner Mary Ann 
Cassard, John Bacon Master, on the 24th of November, 1838, Correspondence on Vessels 
under the Flag of the United States: 15-16. 
83
 Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Fox, Foreign Office, August 14, 1839, Correspondence on Vessels 
under the Flag of the United States: 49. 
47 
 
Palmerston: “owing to the numerous transfers of American vessels which have taken 
place in Havana, something more than a mere connivance in fraud may be thus brought 
home to gentlemen [Messrs. Trist and Smith], who already possess so many other claims 
on the gratitude of their slaving associates.”84  In Havana the consul-general, who the 
British accused of covering Spanish enterprises with American papers, was Nicholas 
Trist. 
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CHAPTER SIX: NICHOLAS TRIST - CONSUL-GENERAL IN HAVANA 
As consul-general, Nicholas Trist was the official representative of the United 
States’ government in Cuba.  He was responsible for protecting American commercial 
interests in the Spanish colony.  He was also responsible for authenticating the bill of sale 
of American ships with his notation on the ships official register.  He was responsible for 
authenticating the ship’s manifest of cargo shipped.  His signature permitted slavers to 
clear Havana under the American flag, with the authority of the United States protecting 
them on the high seas.  He was also charged with gathering information concerning 
violations of American law on the high seas, which included slaving.  He was also to 
cooperate with local authorities concerning American citizens violating local laws. 
Trist was driven by two interests: the ideals of the Enlightenment and hostility 
toward the British.  He was married to Virginia Jefferson Randolph, a granddaughter of 
Thomas Jefferson.  He studied law under Jefferson and adopted many of his ideals.  His 
connection to the third President got him an appointment to West Point, just after the War 
of 1812 when American opposition to Britain was still peaked.  In 1828 he was appointed 
to a position as clerk in the State Department of President John Quincy Adams who 
himself had continually protested British demands for the right to search as Secretary of 
State under James Monroe.  Trist parlayed a friendship with Andrew Jackson Donelson 
into political appointments by the fervently anti-British President Andrew Jackson, 
culminating in his appointment as Consul-General in Havana in 1834. 
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Trist’s actions as consul are best understood by knowing his feelings on slavery.  
His position was similar to that of Jefferson: Although personally opposed to slavery he 
felt that the practice was humane because it delivered Africans from the paganism of 
Africa.  Southerners had built a well-regulated system in which slaves were well-cared 
for.  He reported that he personally recalled a slave that wanted to remain a slave in 
America rather than return to Africa.85  What he hated was the abolitionist movement, 
feeling that it was filled with fanaticism, hypocrisy and an eagerness to put the lives of 
Southerners at risk.86  Slaves could not simply be emancipated as the abolitionists wanted 
since they lacked the intelligence and morality that was necessary for democratic society 
that the United States was trying to build.87  As his mentor said, “We have the wolf by the 
ears.”  Therefore, slavery had to remain, even if it was a blight on the democratic society 
of the United States.  
If his feelings about slavery were mixed, his hatred toward the British was clear.  
As an American nationalist he resented the British overstepping their rights under the 
Law of Nations in their suppression activities, what he stated was based upon “mock 
humanitarianism.”  He believed that the British had bullied the Spanish into a suppression 
treaty and that the Cubans were justified in skirting its provisions.  He tried to stay on 
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friendly terms with the Spanish Captain-General of Cuba, knowing that he was a large-
scale criminal, pocketing money for every slave he allowed to disembark in Havana.88 
As consul, Trist signed-off on the sale of ships, the changing of crews, and the 
granting of clearances.  Trist did not see his position in Havana to be that of a policeman, 
a magistrate or an investigator; in fact he considered it unethical for the consul to pry into 
the cargo manifests of any commercial venture.  He considered his role as consul to be 
more of a public notary, performing duties on behalf of American citizens at their 
request, and signing off on declarations made to him under oath.  He did not investigate 
or pass judgment, his duty was to affix his signature and his seal to any declaration that a 
fellow citizen made before him.89  Yet, in spite of appearances Trist did not seek 
unregulated slave trade.  He succeeded in curbing the hiring of American seamen in the 
slave trade.90  He suggested stricter legal requirements to make it more difficult for 
slavers to gain access to American ships, and made the recommendation that the United 
States use its own Navy to suppress the slave trade in an effort to preempt the British 
from assuming police powers over American vessels.91  In lieu of the stricter legal 
requirements, Trist continued signing-off on clearance certificates for American ships, no 
matter who owned them. 
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During his stay in Havana Trist’s rival was the British Commission on the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade.  As Trist was arriving in Havana, Great Britain sent two 
abolitionists to Havana to act as the British Commission.  Trist refused to recognize their 
status since the United States was not a signatory to any slave trade suppression treaty 
with Britain.  For their part the commission reported to London every act of collusion 
between Trist and Cuba’s slavers. 
When the consul-general of Portugal was recalled because of his own corruption, 
the Portuguese appointed Trist to be acting Portuguese consul in Havana as well.  He now 
issued registries and flags of both nations to shipping ventures.  British commissioner 
Richard Madden was astonished, noting “The entire slave trade of the island of Cuba was 
then passing through the identical hands of N.P. Trist, the Consul-General of the United 
States at Havana.”92  During his time in Havana the British commissioners issued a 
number of protests to Trist and, when those went unanswered, to his superiors in 
Washington. 
In 1840 the Commission delivered a report to Trist related to the activities of the 
Venus which left Cuba under the American flag, was visited by a British cruiser but not 
seized, then returned to Cuba under the Portuguese flag with 860 slaves.  Trist returned 
the report to the commissioners without comment.  He followed that up a few weeks later 
with a sixteen-page response, a “violent vindictive” toward the commission, the British 
government, and the British people whom he called, the “deluded victims of certain 
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deceivers, self-seekers, practisers of theatrical exhibitions, and other kinds of public 
imposters.”93  The letter refused to answer to the abuse of the American flag. 
The British commission delivered a second letter to Trist reminding him of the 
agreement in the Treaty of Ghent to exchange information concerning slavers.  Trist 
responded with a 276-page letter, described by Madden as being of “rude demeanor, 
supercilious carriage, insolent tone, and uncouth address.”94  He responded to every 
complaint of the British in tedious detail, refuting that he knowingly and willing issued 
American clearance certificates to slavers.  The response asserted British hypocrisy, 
demanding that Trist preform “miracles” in apprehending slavers, while the 
commissioners watched as English-made iron shackles were being sold in Havana’s open 
markets.  Trist further detailed his own opinions on the morality of slavery and finished 
with a diatribe explaining how, despite the institution of slavery, American democracy 
was a superior system to British oligarchy and how he looked forward “with heartfelt 
pleasure” to a time “when the people of England will be free – when the oppression under 
which, in every possible shape, their heads have been so long bowed into the very dust, 
shall have come to its end, when the House of Lords shall exist only on a page of 
history.”95  Obviously the British were getting nowhere with the American consul-
general. 
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The British next protested to Washington D.C.  In July 1840, the House 
Commerce Committee concluded that “the documents submitted to them do not at all 
affect the character of Mister Trist for integrity and honor, and they are unanimously of 
the opinion that no case is presented calling for any action by the House of 
Representatives.”96  An investigation by the State Department concluded that Trist should 
have been more active in investigating the illegal use of the American flag in the slave 
trade, but his “omission to do so has not been the result of indifference or any more 
corrupt motive; but of a settled conviction that any measures which he could take for the 
purposes alluded to would be entirely ineffectual from the impossibility of procuring such 
evidence as would be available in a court of justice.”97  Trist was removed from his 
position after the Whigs won the White House in 1841, after which Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster told him that “this resolution has been adopted without his having formed 
any judgment of the charges which have been suggested against you.”98  Ironically the 
number of ships clearing Havana for the African coast after 1841 declined significantly.99 
The British recognized that the actions of Nicholas Trist, whether they were “sins 
of commission” or “sins of omission,” was a threat to their crusade to suppress the slave 
trade.  The British charged that Trist was complicit in the falsifying of registrations and 
issuing of American flags at Havana.  He mounted a strong defense and the House 
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Commerce Committee – which was dominated by Northern representatives – cleared him 
of any wrongdoing, but the State Department found that he could have done more.  Trist 
was a lawyer who took a “strict constructionists” view of the law.  He never met with the 
British commissioners because his country was not party to any treaty with the British.  
What in Trist’s mind demanded that the relationship be adversarial?  Was it in favor of 
advancing the slave trade?  Not necessarily.  He was ambivalent about slavery.  In fact he 
supported Abraham Lincoln in the 1860 election, received no patronage from the 
President afterward, and remained loyal to the Union after Virginia seceded.   
Trist was not ambivalent about the British, though.  Like most other Americans in 
the first half of the nineteenth century Trist was simply hostile to the British, whom he 
had learned to hate at the start of his political career.  As a Virginian he was also hostile 
to abolitionists, particularly those he was forced to deal with on the British Commission 
in Havana.  Every time the abolitionists on the British Committee for the Suppression of 
the Slave Trade called him on an issue, he simply pushed back.  
What is also apparent is that Trist was a “loose cannon” diplomatically.  At the 
same time the British protest reached Congress the House Commerce Committee was 
already looking into a petition of 167 ships’ captains demanding the recall of Trist from 
his position in Havana.  Their complaint was that Trist’s conduct was “tyrannical, 
unlawful, unjust, and highly injurious and offensive to our profession,” saying that he 
failed to protect American commercial interests by insulting and oppressing her captains 
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and favoring Spanish authorities over his fellow captains.100  The new Whig government 
recalled Trist from Havana before the petition was not acted upon. 
Trist returned to public life in 1847 when President James K. Polk sent him to 
Mexico City to negotiate an end to the Mexican War.  A few months into the negotiations 
the prospects of the war changed and Polk ordered him to return.  Trist refused and 
continued negotiating with the Mexican government, finalizing the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo on February 2, 1848.  Trist negotiated the terms that Polk sought, but the 
President refused to pay his chief negotiator for his insubordination. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: LEWIS CASS AND THE QUINTUPLE TREATY 
With the increasing number of American-flagged ships the Royal Navy stepped-
up its visitations.  President Martin Van Buren, at first, welcomed the more intense 
scrutiny by the British looking for those prostituting the flag, but he later relented 
realizing that he was sanctioning British violations of American sovereignty under the 
Law of Nations.  The United States diplomatic corps returned to a defiant stance, the 
most defiant taken by Ambassador Lewis Cass, whose actions scuttled a treaty with 
France and forced the British to negotiate a treaty with the United States that did not 
include the Right to Search. 
The British Ramp-up Suppression 
As much as the United States was a thorn in the side of the international 
movement to suppress the slave trade, the French were equally troublesome.  The French 
vacillated on the abolition of slavery altogether.  In 1822 William Wilberforce lamented  
the French government reprobates the traffic in the strongest terms, and declares 
that it is using its utmost efforts for the prevention of so great an evil:—That it is 
deeply to be regretted that a government which has been generally regarded as 
eminent for its efficiency, should here alone find its efforts so entirely paralyzed. 
And yet, 
Proposals are circulated for slave-trading voyages, inviting the smallest capitals, 
and tempting adventurers by the hopes of enormous profits:—that the few ships of 
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war of that country stationed in Africa, offer no material obstruction to the trade, 
nor do the governors of her colonies appear to be more active.101 
France held firmly to the principles of their constitution that required French 
citizens to be tried in French courts.  Here the suspected slave trader was out of the hands 
of the apprehending agency, facing a jury that was already hostile to most things British.  
France eventually agreed to treaties with Britain in 1831 and in 1833 giving both navies 
the reciprocal right to search in limited areas.102  These treaties led to significant 
decreases in the slavers’ use of the tri-colour.   
As the French flag disappeared from the Atlantic, the Stars and Stripes became 
more prominent.  One British commodore complained to the Admiralty of the “shameful 
prostitution of the American flag, for under that ensign alone is the Slave Trade now 
conducted.”103  Governor Buchanan of Liberia stated, “The chief obstacle to the success 
of the very active measures pursued by the British government for the suppression of the 
slave trade on the coast, is the American flag.  Never was the proud banner of freedom so 
extensively used by those pirates upon liberty and humanity, as at this season.”104  
President Martin Van Buren conceded to Congress: 
Recent experience has shown that the provision in our existing laws which relate 
to the sale and transfer of American vessels while abroad are extremely defective.  
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Advantage has been taken of these defects to give to vessels, wholly belonging to 
foreigners and navigating the ocean an apparent American ownership.  This 
character has been so well simulated as to afford them comparative security in 
prosecuting the slave trade – a trade emphatically denounced in our statutes, 
regarded with abhorrence by our citizens, and of which the effectual suppression 
is nowhere more sincerely desired than in the United States.105 
Americans said they wanted suppression, but not if it meant British searches of American 
ships.  
In August, 1839, the House of Lords tried a new approach to force the Americans 
to accept the reciprocal right to search.  A bill was introduced giving the navy nearly 
unchallenged power to detain slavers by indemnifying officers countersued for illegal 
seizures of ships, covering their losses in court if a judgment went against them.  Without 
the fear of losing thousands of pounds in a trial, captains could be more aggressive in 
stopping and searching slavers.  Much of the debate leading up to the vote centered on 
American intransigence in the effort to stop the trade.  The bill passed the Lords by a vote 
of 39-28,106 but the government never enforced the bill because of “insuperable 
difficulties” in its execution.107  Nevertheless the tough talk from Parliament sent a 
message to the Royal Navy concerning slavers flying the American flag. 
In January 1839 the American-flagged Eagle was detained by British authorities, 
having an entirely Spanish crew save for the one American who called himself master 
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and owner.  Two months later the Clara was detained.  In lieu of an American court or 
commission in West Africa, the two ships were delivered to Freetown to be adjudicated 
at the Anglo-Spanish Mixed Court.  When the court refused to take responsibility for the 
ships, Commander William Tucker dispatched Lieutenant Fitzgerald of HMS Buzzard to 
escort the ships to New York with the following note:  
Trusting it will be considered, that my only motive for taking upon myself this 
delicate interference can be but zeal for a strict discharge of my duty, which 
renders it imperative on me to take the earliest opportunity of laying before the 
government of a friendly power, with proofs, the abuse to which its national flag 
is subject on this Coast, in covering and protecting the property of persons (not 
citizens of the United States,) concerned in the inhuman traffic of slaves, which I 
am employed to suppress.108 
Arriving in New York Harbor the Eagle and Clara became the first American ships to 
arrive as prizes of another country since the Revolutionary War.  Palmerston sent a note 
to ambassador, Mr. Fox, directing him: 
You will present the United States Government a note containing the substance of 
the information contained in these papers; and you will express, on the part of Her 
Majesty’s Government, an earnest hope that to proof which the cases of these 
vessels afford, that the flag of the United States is now resorted to by the Slave 
Traders as protection for their piratical practices, may induce the United States to 
concur with Great Britain in admitting, under certain regulations, a mutual right of 
search of the merchant vessels of each nation, or else that the Government of the 
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United States may be able to devise some other effectual mode for preventing the 
flag of the Union from being applied to such iniquitous purposes.109 
Two weeks later HMS Harlequin captured the American-flagged Wyoming and a prize 
crew sailed her into New York.  In the fall HMS Dolphin seized the Butterfly and the 
Catharine, the latter with 350 pairs of handcuffs, 570 spoons, cooking arrangements for 
five hundred persons, and both English and Spanish logbooks.110  These were sent to 
New York also.  The flotilla of British prizes now moored in New York Harbor sent the 
message of American complicity in the slave trade. 
Many Americans denounced the British action as a violation of “freedom of the 
seas,”111 but President Van Buren decided to act, ordering District Attorney Benjamin F. 
Butler to look into the matter.  The courts ruled that the Eagle and Clara were Spanish 
ships and they were returned to the British.112  The New York court ruled that the 
Wyoming, the Butterfly, and the Catharine were American vessels and they were 
condemned.  Their captains jumped bail before they could be prosecuted.113  The British 
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Foreign Office next turned over to the United States letters showing that Baltimore 
shipbuilders were complicit in building and fitting out vessels for the slave trade.  
Information taken from the Catharine showed that her original owners did not sell her to 
their front man in Havana and therefore had their names on the ship’s registry.  The 
British also had information implicating the owner of the schooner Elvira who was also 
arrested.  Two more schooners were seized as they attempted to leave Baltimore.114  
Prominent merchants of Baltimore were now under careful scrutiny. 
Supreme Court Justice Roger B. Taney put the ships’ owners on trial for violating 
an 1818 act which allowed the courts to prosecute the owners of slavers as they could 
captains.  At their trials the men pleaded ignorance of any wrongdoing, were afforded 
high praise by their peers, and the juries of their fellow Marylanders readily believed 
them.  By the time the case of the Ann came before him, the frustrated Taney condemned 
the vessel, denouncing the builder as a criminal, and sharply criticizing the flaunting of 
the law that had disgraced the American flag and the city of Baltimore.  The city’s 
shipbuilders took careful note of Taney’s denunciation and condemnation of the Ann; 
new clippers would no longer be built in Baltimore specifically for slaving.115  British 
pressure successfully provoked the American government into action.  That action would 
not last long. 
Van Buren’s acceptance of the British seizures and the prosecutions that followed 
led the latter to step-up their enforcement on the high seas.  Now any ship flying the Stars 
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and Stripes would be seized even if the evidence was that it was Spanish-owned.  Several 
American-flagged ships were condemned as their papers were deemed worthless.  The 
American flag disappeared from the African coast.  Van Buren and Secretary of State 
John Forsyth realized that they had sanctioned British violations of American sovereignty 
under the Law of Nations.  Strongly worded protests were sent to London demanding that 
British cruisers not molest American vessels even if their flags and papers appeared 
fraudulent.  When pressed by the British, U.S. ambassador Stevenson conceded that 
much of the slave trade was still going on under the Stars and Stripes.  Lord Aberdeen 
responded that the admission was, “reasonable ground of suspicion which the Law of 
Nations requires in such a case.  The admitted fact of this abuse creates the right of 
inquiry.”116  The British believed that international law gave them the right, and they 
were resolved, to continue visiting American-flagged ships. 
Ambassador Cass Scuttles the Quintuple Treaty 
On December 20, 1841, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia 
finalized the Quintuple Treaty for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.  The five nations 
agreed to equate the slave trade with the crime of “piracy,” and as pirates the slavers’ 
ships would be denationalized and the crew would lose the protection of their flag.  
Furthermore, like the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch treaties, each nation agreed to the 
reciprocal right to search, giving the cruisers of each nation the right to detain and search 
vessels “on reasonable grounds of being suspected of being engaged in the traffic in 
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slaves.”117  With the five major European powers on board, along with three maritime 
powers and the new republics of Latin America, the British were on their way to 
changing the Law of Nations to allow the right to search. 
One American smelled a rat.  On February 1, 1842, soon after the treaty became 
public, a pamphlet emerged in Paris entitled “An Examination of the Question now in 
Discussion, between the American and British Governments, Concerning the Right to 
Search, By an American.”  The “American” was Minister to France, Lewis Cass.  In his 
“Examination” Cass made an appeal to the Law of Nations.  Britain’s motivation for 
reciprocal right to search agreements was so that the action would become accepted 
practice under international maritime law.  As the only objector to the practice the United 
States would be backed into the corner as a “rogue” state that did not play by the same 
rules as everyone else. 
Cass decried the British attempt to impose the right to search on the ships of every 
nation on the high seas as if it were the “Constable of the Oceans.”  If the treaty were 
allowed, “To their flag it will give virtual supremacy of the seas… because it will be 
found in practice, that ninety-nine times out of one hundred, it would be their cruisers 
which will search the vessels of other nations.”118  Cass noted that the right of search that 
the British sought was “arbitrary, vexatious, and not only liable, but necessarily liable, to 
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serious abuse,”119 for upon a visit “hatches will be broken open, the cargo overhauled, 
property dilapidated, and many articles will be taken without permission and without 
compensation.”120  For Cass the right to search ships along the African coast promoted 
British efforts to protect their interests and trade as the Royal Navy was likely to send 
vessels to trial under very slight pretenses.  The British government had already stated 
that they would consider foreign-flagged ships operating in certain latitudes to be ipso 
facto “suspicious.” 
Recognizing American feelings the British offered to forego the “right to search” 
a ship in order to have the “right to visit,” to ascertain if a ship had the right to fly the 
American flag.  This was little more than a semantic game for Cass, who remained 
intransigent, arguing that “One may call it a search and the other a visit, but both would 
be found vexatious visitations [italics his]”121  A “search” and a “visit” were one and the 
same. 
Against British arguments that the Americans were only trying to promote the 
slave trade, Cass replied, “Its connexion to the African slave trade is but incidental.”122  
With the memory of impressment in the War of 1812 and the events of 1825 still fresh in 
the minds of many Americans seventeen years later, he added emphatically, “No, it is not 
African slavery the United States wish to encourage.  It is…the slavery of American 
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sailors, they seek to prevent.”123  In referencing the Le Louis decision Cass reminded the 
British that their own courts had ruled against the right of their own ships to search 
foreign ships in times of peace.124  “Until now the right of search has been a belligerent 
right, belonging only to a state at war,” he asserted.  “Here is the first formal claim to 
exercise it in time of peace.”125  He restated the American concern that British searches of 
American ships under the pretext of slave trade suppression might lead to impressment in 
time of peace and derided the reciprocal right to search is a “mockery,” as the American 
officer would board a British ship to search, while a British officer would board an 
American to search and impress.126  He concluded that the slavery of impressment is as 
bad and repugnant as African slavery, and that the United States was prepared to fight 
against it. 
[T]he first man impressed from the ship of his country, and detained, with an 
avowal of the right, by order of the British government, will be the signal of a 
war.  A war too, which will be long, bitter and accompanied, it may be, with 
many vicissitudes.  For no citizen of the United States can shut his eyes to the 
power of Great Britain, nor to the gallantry of her fleets and armies.  But twice the 
Republic has come out honorably for a similar contest, and with a just cause, she 
would again hope for success.  At any rate, she would try.127  
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Cass returned to the successes of the Law of Nations in recent history stating, “Piracy has 
been put down, without any violation of the freedom of the seas, or of the independence 
of nations.  The slave trade may be put down also, with the same sacred regard to those 
principles.”128  It was for that sacred regard that the United States would remain a 
persistent objector. 
The intended audience for the “Examination on the Question” was not Britain but 
France. The persistent objections of the United States were intended to slow down the 
trend toward the codification of the right to search into the Law of Nations; Cass hoped 
that additional objections from France would reverse the inertia the British had created.  
At its worst Britain was trying to engineer a war of Europe against the United States, for, 
as Cass suggested, “In order to avoid war with Europe the United States must submit to 
the demands of Britain.”129  Cass chided Britain for “[T]hat excess of philanthropy which 
would tilt a spear at every nation, and light up the flames of general war, in order to 
accomplish its own charitable views, in its own exclusive way, almost at the end of the 
world.”130  For Cass, philanthropy by force was not philanthropy at all. 
For France not to sign the Quintuple Treaty the Americans would have a strong 
ally against the British effort. 
                                                 
128
 Cass, 57. 
129
 Cass, 10-11. 
130
 Letter, Cass to Webster, February 15, 1842, in Message from the President: 191. 
67 
 
The reply to Cass was quick.  In a “Response to an ‘American,’” Sir William 
Gore Ouseley praised Cass for “great, though mischievous, ingenuity in hair-splitting.”131  
He was incredulous that anyone would question the humanitarianism of the British: 
It appears scarcely credible that in the same pages containing these ingenious 
professions and disclaimers, England is accused directly, or by implication, of the 
basest motives, of sordid self-interest, masking under pretended philanthropy, that 
it is asserted that there would be a ‘disgrace’ in entering into mutual agreements 
with her.132 
Ouseley presupposes that American opposition to the Quintuple Treaty was prompted by 
the interests of the Southern states: “…the covert reason be the opposition of the slave 
holding interests, which, as long as the present system of the United States Government 
exists, will be exerted to prevent aught which may ensure the extinction of the slave-trade 
and shew real opposition to slavery.”133  In response to the notion that the British were 
interested in expanding their commerce in Africa by slowing others, Ouseley states that, 
in fact, “The commerce of all nations, parties to the slave-trade suppression treaties has 
prodigiously increased in the years that have passed, during which the right to search has 
mutually existed.”134  Of Cass’s argument that the reciprocal right to search would lead to 
the impressment of Americans, Ouseley stated that British law no longer allowed 
impressment in time of peace.  He further mocked the American-established 
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circumstances by which British officers may stop an American-flagged ship: “Thus you 
may visit a vessel bearing the United States flag, if she be not an American; how are you 
supposed to ascertain that fact without boarding?”135  In the conclusion Ouseley makes a 
plea to the “American,” recognizing his willingness to use arms against forcible 
detention, he urges, “For the respect of the present and future ages – by your hopes of 
freedom and love of God, do not go to war on behalf of the slave trade!”136  
On February 13, Francois Guizot, French minister of foreign affairs, received 
from the American legation in Paris an official protest against the French entry into the 
Quintuple Treaty, Minister Cass stating, “The United States do not fear that any such 
united attempts will be made upon their independence.  What, however they may 
reasonably fear is that in the execution of the treaty measures will be taken which they 
must resist.”  As a signatory to the treaty “it is the duty of France to pursue the same 
course…. It is obvious the United States will do to her as they do to Britain, if she 
persists in this attack upon their independence.”137  The end result of the Quintuple 
Treaty was the illegal searches of American ships.  The only American response was war. 
The French had other interests in rejecting the Quintuple Treaty.  The successive 
French governments of the 1830s all promoted free enterprise and trade with West 
Africa.  Much of that trade was in the form of “auxiliaries,” delivering goods to be traded 
for slaves, which were then to be delivered to Brazil via a second ship.  British naval 
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captain Richard Madden reported that the French were the second largest trader of goods 
to slave dealers after the United States138; most of the trade was through the commercial 
house of Regis frères based in Marseilles.139  There was still some money to be made in 
the slave trade. 
One week after Cass delivered his protest to Guizot, the commander of the French 
squadron off of West Africa, Captain Bouet, reported that French merchant vessels 
landing cloth, spirits, and iron were being harassed and interfered with by British 
cruisers.  The British justified their actions by saying that “France, which was against 
slavers, could not wish to supply them.”  Bouet also complained that the British were 
allowing their own merchant vessels with the same cargoes to land without harassing 
them. The Royal Navy did not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate French 
traders and only seemed to be trying to impede French trade with Africa.140  French anger 
with the British was peaking at the same time that the Quintuple Treaty was up for 
ratification and when the treaty reached the National Assembly opposition was so 
profound that its members voted against it nearly unanimously.  The French next went to 
work dismantling the right to search treaties of 1831 and 1833.141  Cass had successfully 
playing upon French jealousy of Britain and the belief that the British were 
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condescending in their approach to the Treaty.  The drive to insert the right to search into 
the maritime code of the law of nations had hit a major stumbling block. 
France’s failure to ratify the Quintuple Treaty left the British dumbfounded.  
Palmerston noted that the proposal did not originate with the British government, but 
with the British and the French together.  The two governments approached Russia, 
Prussia and Austria together.  It was unprecedented for a government to back out of a 
treaty that it had itself sanctioned and approved.  Palmerston observed, “no reason, 
consistent with the practice of governments, could be assigned by the government of 
France, for refusing its ratification to what was concluded by its own direction and 
sanction.”142  For the most part the blame for the failure of the French to ratify the 
Quintuple Treaty falls on the shoulders, not of anyone French, but on those of American 
ambassador Lewis Cass.  
What interest did Cass have in scuttling the Quintuple Treaty?  Cass was a 
Northern Democrat, but he was not a “doughface,” a Northerner with Southern 
sympathies.  He was not in favor of slavery.  He twice ran for President in the 1840s, but 
his moderate stance on slavery cost him both elections.  He lost the Democratic 
nomination in 1844 to James K. Polk, a slaveholder from Tennessee.  He finally won the 
Democratic nomination when Polk did not run for a second term in 1848.  During the 
campaign for the general election he endorsed “popular sovereignty” in the new 
territories gained in the war with Mexico.  Southern Democrats reacted by throwing their 
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support to the Whig nominee, Zachery Taylor, a slaveholder from Louisiana.  Taylor won 
the election and Cass returned to Michigan where he won a seat representing that state in 
the United States Senate. 
Understanding Cass’s moderate position on slavery shows that he was not 
interested in scuttling the Quintuple Treaty on behalf of the slave power in the South as 
Sir William Gore Ousely suggested.  He was using the Law of Nations to justify a shot at 
the British, whom he detested.  All better if nullifying the right to search made it difficult 
for the British to enforce their slave trade suppression policies.  The connection to the 
slave trade was coincidental.  Cass simply wanted to thumb his nose at his lifetime foe. 
Cass was referred to as “General” for his efforts during the War of 1812, fighting 
the British and their Native allies in furious action in his home state of Michigan.  Cass 
biographer Andrew C. McLaughlin concedes that “The prime motives for the actions of 
Cass in this affair was his inveterate dislike and distrust of England….It will be 
remembered that not until 1839 did the English give up their efforts in the 
Northwest,…and that his whole life preceding his admission to Jackson’s cabinet had 
brought him into antagonism with British aggression.”143  In a note to Daniel Webster, 
Cass admitted, “All I have is on the frontier liable to be ruined by war, but let it all go, 
rather than yield an inch to a haughty nation.”144  The evidence shows that Cass was a 
moderate on the issue of slavery.  His opposition to the “right to search” was not because 
he wanted to protect the American slave trade rather it was based upon his respect of 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: WEBSTER-ASHBURTON - THE CREATION  
OF AN AMERICAN SUPPRESSION SQUADRON 
The British would not relent in their efforts to gain the right to search from the 
United States.  Lord Palmerston distinctly stated that “the exemption of the vessels of the 
United States from search is a doctrine to which the British government never can and 
never will subscribe.”145  The scuttling of the Quintuple Treaty set them back 
significantly, though.  Without the French the drive to codify the right to search into the 
maritime code of the Law of Nations hit a major snag.  Without the French to put 
diplomatic pressure on the United States the British had to go back to face-to-face 
negotiations with the Americans.  Fortunately for the British Cass was an ambassador, 
not one with authority in the diplomatic arena.  The British had a friendlier ear in 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster.  With Webster, the British successfully negotiated a 
more robust American effort in suppressing the slave trade. 
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
In scuttling the Quintuple Treaty Cass had jumped the gun; in the interest of time 
he made his protest to the French without consulting Washington.  When word reached 
President John Tyler, he sanctioned the protest and accepted the doctrines included.  
Thereafter the American position on British visits to American merchants became:  
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1st.  That in the absence of treaty stipulations, the United States will maintain the 
immunity of merchant vessels on the seas, to the fullest extent to which the Law 
of Nations authorizes. 
2nd.  That if the government of the United States, animated by a sincere desire to 
put an end to the African slave trade, shall be induced to enter into treaty 
stipulations, for that purpose with any foreign power, those stipulations will be 
such as shall be limited to their true and single object, such as shall not be 
embarrassing to innocent commerce, and such especially, as shall neither imply 
any inequality,…Nor can tend in any way to establish such inequality, in their 
practical operations.146 
American negotiators kept these two points in mind when they next sat down with the 
British.  The immunity of American ships was absolute.  But what would the United 
States do about the prostitution of the flag?  
Incidents unrelated to the slave trade brought the United States and Great Britain 
back to the negotiating table in 1842.  The bulk of the Treaty of Washington – more 
commonly referred to as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty – concerned the disputed 
boundary between Maine and Canada, but the British brought the issue of the right to 
search to the table.  Webster rejected the right to search again, but he did commit the 
United States to making a greater commitment to suppress the slave trade.  In article eight 
of the treaty both nations agreed to commit to the African coast squadrons - 
to carry in all not less than eighty guns, to enforce, separately and respectively, 
the laws rights and obligations of each of the two countries, for the suppression of 
the Slave Trade, the said squadrons to be independent of each other, but the two 
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Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders to the officers 
commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually to act 
in concert and cooperation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise, for 
the attainment of the true object of this article.147 
With no specific statement concerning the searching of vessels there was still a 
question of how far either side could go in enforcing the dictates of the treaty. 
The issue of impressment still continued to swirl through political circles.  In his 
address to the Senate President Tyler admitted that, although the British reject the policy 
of impressment during time of peace, the topic was still important to many in the Senate 
and that it has been thought the part of wisdom now to take it into serious and earnest 
consideration.148  Webster notified Lord Ashburton that the United States’ interpretation 
of the treaty was that, “In every regularly documented American merchant vessel the 
crew who navigate it will find their protection in the flag which is over them.”149  
Webster vigorously reaffirmed to Congress that impressment was illegal, and that “the 
deck of every American vessel is inaccessible, for any such purpose.”150  In no way was 
impressment allowed under the terms of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.  But what of the 
right to search?  Webster stated that “regularly documented” merchant ships had 
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immunity from British searches, but that left open the possibility of British “visits” to 
American merchants to check paperwork and determine if the ship had the right to carry 
the American flag.  Many Americans still saw British “visits” as a search by a different 
name.  
The Senate ratified the treaty but it faced significant opposition.  Upon hearing of 
the ratification of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Lewis Cass resigned, arguing that by 
signing the treaty we “place our municipal laws, in some measure, beyond the reach of 
Congress.”151  Cass’s friends in Congress argued that the Treaty of Washington forced 
the United States to give up its immunity from British searches.  Webster’s response was 
that,  
We had no such right to give up.… The arrangement made by this treaty was 
designed to carry into effect those stipulations in the Treaty of Ghent which we 
thought binding on us, as well as to effect an object important to this country, to 
the interests of humanity, and to the general cause of civilization throughout the 
world, without raising the difficulty of the right to search.  The object of it was to 
accomplish all of that, in a way that should avoid the possibility of subjecting our 
vessels, under any pretense, to the right to search.152   
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty put the United States Navy in the position to 
protect American merchant vessels against those very searches.  In a speech to the 
Senate, President Tyler said of the right to search: 
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No such concession should be made and that the United States had both the will 
and the ability to enforce their own laws and protect their flag from being used for 
purposes wholly forbidden by those laws, and obnoxious to the moral censure of 
the world….The United States have been standing up for the freedom of the seas, 
they have not thought proper to make that a pretext for avoiding the fulfillment of 
their treaty stipulations, or a ground for giving countenance to a trade reprobated 
by our laws. 153 
Under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Tyler and Webster believed that the United States 
had the best of both worlds.  They upheld the dictates of humanity by doing their part in 
suppressing the slave trade, yet still had justice by not allowing British searches. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE U.S. NAVY’S “AFRICA SQUADRON” 
From its first cruise of in 1843 it was clear that slave trade suppression was not 
the sole purpose of the United States Navy’s Africa Squadron.  Nor was it the most 
important purpose.  The squadron was first charged by the Secretary of Navy with 
protecting legitimate American commerce from bad actors along the African coast and 
from overzealous British naval officers.  Flag Officer Commodore Matthew C. Perry had 
the task of establishing an American naval presence off of West Africa, and also a great 
interest in seeing to the security of Liberia the nation in whose founding he played a 
major role.  The suppression of the slave trade was almost an afterthought for the first 
Africa Squadron. 
The U.S. Navy “Africa Squadron” and Commodore Perry 
To command the first Africa Squadron the navy selected Matthew Calbraith 
Perry, a logical choice as he had served on two previous cruises off of West Africa.  His 
first cruise in 1819 was as first lieutenant of Cyane, escorting the first volunteers of the 
American Colonization Society’s effort to repatriate freed slaves to Africa.  His second 
cruise was in 1821, as captain of the armed-schooner Shark, with orders to convey a new 
American commissioner to the “Negro colony” of Liberia.  Between the two cruises 
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Perry gained experience in diplomacy with the British at Sierra Leone, the Portuguese at 
the Cape Verde Islands, and the natives on the continent.154 
During his two previous cruises Perry took part in interdicting more than a dozen 
slavers.  One of the ships he had stopped was the French-flagged Caroline, carrying 133 
slaves bound for the French West Indies.  The physical state of the cargo inside is best 
expressed by Midshipman Lynch, one of Perry’s crew: 
The overpowering smell and the sight presented by her slave-deck can never be 
obliterated from the memory.  In a space of about 15 by 40 feet, and four feet 
high, between-decks, 163 [sic] negroes, men, women, and children were 
promiscuously confined….Their bodies were so emaciated, and their black skins 
were so shrunk upon their facial bones, that in their torpor, they resembled so 
many Egyptian mummies half-awakened in to life…. 
I never saw the sympathies of our men more deeply moved than were those of our 
crew.  Immediately after taking possession, while the papers were being 
examined, we hoisted up a cask of water, and some bread and beef, and gave each 
poor slave a long drink and a hearty meal. 
Perry’s possession of the Caroline was short-lived, though.  Noting that the ship’s 
papers were in order and that the French were not bound by any international treaty to 
suppress the slave trade, Perry was compelled to release her over the protests of his 
officers.  Perry was well-acquainted with the horrors of the trade and now returned to 
Africa with orders to put it down where possible.   
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There were likely other motives with the choice of Perry as first flag officer of the 
Africa Squadron involving diplomacy with the British.  His father, Captain Christopher 
Perry, had been captured and imprisoned by the British during the American Revolution.  
His brother, Oliver Hazard Perry, led an American squadron to victory against the British 
at Lake Erie in the War of 1812.  Matthew himself was a midshipman during the war.  
The Navy further thumbed its nose at the British by assigning Perry the Macedonian as 
his flagship, formerly a Royal Navy frigate, captured during the War of 1812, and 
“razeed” by the Americans.  If the Navy sought a leader to follow the “letter” of the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, but perhaps not so much the “spirit,” Perry was the right 
choice. 
Before leaving New York in June 1843 aboard Saratoga he received the 
following instructions from Secretary of the Navy, Abel P. Upshur: 
The right of citizens engaged in lawful commerce are under the protection of our 
flag; and it is the chief purpose as well as the chief duty of our naval power to see 
that these rights are not improperly abridged or invaded. 
…It is to be borne in mind, that while the United States sincerely desires the 
suppression of the slave trade, and design to exert their power, in good faith, for 
the accomplishment of that object, they do not regard the success of their efforts 
as their paramount interest, nor as their paramount duty.  They are not prepared to 
sacrifice to it any of their rights as an independent nation; nor will the object in 
view justify the exposure of their own people to injurious and vexatious 
interruptions in the prosecution of their lawful pursuits.155 
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This directive, with the primary duty being the protection of American commerce and 
slave trade suppression being secondary, became the standard order to the squadron.156  
Even though the goal of suppressing the slave trade was second on the priority list issued 
to Perry, Upshur added the following to his instructions: 
The claim of the United States that their trading vessels should not be visited for 
any purpose…presupposes that the vessel is really an American.  The United 
States certainly do not claim that the mere hoisting of a flag shall give immunity 
to those that have no right to wear it.157 
The hard rhetoric of Lewis Cass notwithstanding, Upshur was well-aware that the 
American flag was being prostituted by slave traders. 
Perry quickly made the American presence in the eastern Atlantic known.  He 
arrived in Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands on June 20, 1843 and got permission 
from the Portuguese to establish a supply depot.  He then penned a note to John Foote, 
commander of the British Africa Squadron, suggesting ways to cooperate in accordance 
with Webster-Ashburton.  He agreed that the two squadrons should exchange their 
“private signals” and communicate information to each other concerning the activities of 
slavers.158  The following month Perry inquired of Liberian President Joseph J. Roberts 
about the status of the slave trade in the area and was assured that no slavers flying the 
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Stars and Stripes had been seen during the past two years.159  In the fall Perry engaged in 
a series of palavers, “meetings of leaders,” with the local African nations around Liberia, 
during which he displayed a fist of steel inside of a velvet glove.  He usually started his 
palavers with a show of force, but conducted them giving even-handed treatment of the 
native nations.  In these palavers Perry received assurances that American trade would 
not be harassed and that Liberian sovereignty would be recognized.  
Concerning the slave trade Perry reported back to Secretary of Navy Upshur from 
Monrovia in July 1843, that “So far as I can learn through diligent inquiry, the American 
flag has not been used, within two years, on this part of the coast, by any vessel engaged 
in the slave trade.”160  He repeated his assertion in a report to Secretary of Navy David 
Henshaw in November, noting, “With all my observation and inquiry, I have not seen or 
heard of a single instance of an American being engaged in the slave trade.”161  This may 
have been true in the area around Liberia and the adjoining British colony of Sierra 
Leone, but the American flag was still providing cover for slavers operating in the Bight 
of Biafra and the Gulf of Guinea.  
When Perry received word from William Jones, the new commander of the 
British squadron, of a possible American slaver operating in the Gallinas River, he 
dispatched the sloop Decatur to investigate.  In the calm evening winds the sloop was 
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roped to the steam frigate HBM Penelope and towed up river.  After visiting the brig 
Lima the captain of the Decatur determined that she was a legitimate trader.  In 
appreciation of the American help Jones sent a note to Perry expressing his wishes for 
further cooperation between the squadrons.162  Anglo-American cooperation, as expected 
by Webster-Ashburton, was at a high point. 
Upon hearing news that a supply ship was wrecked, leaving the squadron strained 
for supplies, Perry ordered the fleet to Madeira in the Canary Islands, partly in search of 
provisions and partly for recreation.  There were no ports on the African coast for the 
men to take “liberty” and Madeira proved the closest place to Africa for crews to get rest 
and recreation.  The fleet returned to the Cape Verdes in July the following year.163  Perry 
had now been in the eastern Atlantic for a full year and had yet to engage in any 
suppression activities. 
The only slaver taken under Perry’s command was in spring 1844 when 
Lieutenant Thomas Craven of the Porpoise fell in with the Baltimore-built Uncas off of 
Gallinas.  In the previous month officers from HMS Alert boarded Uncas: no slaves were 
on board but she had gratings for hatches, cargo “suited to the slave marts,” and there 
were numerous irregularities in her papers.  The British refused to seize her in order to 
avoid any “unpleasant correspondence” between Britain and the U.S.  When Craven 
learned of the murder of the vessel’s master he used that as a pretext to board the ship.  
An inspection of its papers showed that it had cleared from New Orleans with a crew of 
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eight, then made port in Havana where the crew was replaced by a crew of Danes and 
Italians, all with false names.  Craven seized the ship upon this evidence and sent it to 
New Orleans for adjudication, but because it had no slaves on board, the ship was 
acquitted by the New Orleans court.164  Perry later penned a letter to Secretary of Navy 
Henshaw complaining of a “want of vigilance at Havanna [sic] and perhaps at the Ports 
of the United States…in suffering a vessel to clear as the Uncas did from New 
Orleans.”165   
Perry’s command ended in February, 1845.166  Through Perry’s diplomacy, in 
eighteen months of cruising, he had established the United States Navy as a presence in 
West Africa.  In his numerous palavers he had secured the sovereignty of Liberia and 
forced the local nations to respect the American flag and not injure American commerce.  
Of his dealings with the British he was not averse to cooperation, agreeing to “mutual 
acts of courtesy and friendship.”  Yet Perry insisted that the British not infringe on the 
rights of any American in the region, as he reminded his commanders: 
Under no circumstances are you to permit, without resistance to the extent of your 
means, any foreign vessel of war of whatever force or nation, in the exercise of 
any assumed right of search or visitation, to board in your presence (you having 
first forbidden it) any vessel having the American flag displayed.167 
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When Admiral Foote, commander of the British Africa Squadron, suggested a 
joint cruising plan Perry thanked him but pointed out that the American Squadron was 
limited by its small size.   When Foote further suggested that the two sides assist each 
other in bringing to and visiting vessels of whatever flag suspected of being a slaver, 
Perry refused, concerned that the British would expect him to relax his strict policy that 
only U.S. Navy ships had the right to stop and board vessels flying the American flag.  
Upon receiving word that a British officer had boarded and acted insolently toward the 
master of the American-flagged barque Roderick Dhu, Perry requested an immediate 
explanation from Foote.  There was a brisk exchange between the two, but rather than let 
this explode into the open, Perry wrote to Foote that both the British and American 
governments sought “to suppress a traffic obnoxious to religion and humanity” and 
expressed the hope that both navies would emulate each other in carrying out their 
instructions and not interfere with each others’ duties.168  In his time in the station Perry 
earned the respect of the British in regards to the U.S. Navy.  In November 1844 Perry 
reported that, with one exception, there had not been a “solitary instance of an improper 
interference with the American flag.  On the contrary, there appears to be a mutual 
disposition…to cultivate a friendly understanding.”169  In Perry’s time in the station he 
had developed an amicable relationship with the British. 
Despite their commander’s feelings in opposition the slave trade, in eighteen 
months along the slaving areas of Africa, Perry’s squadron only netted one slaver.  It is 
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clear that slave trade suppression was low on the list of priorities; Perry’s record in this 
endeavor left much to be desired.  For the respect that the British showed to Perry and the 
United States Navy, questions still must have lingered concerning American commitment 
to slave trade suppression. 
Limitations of the Squadron 
Throughout the life of the squadron it was hampered by limitations.  The 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty demanded that the United States commit eighty guns to 
suppression, but did not determine how they would be mounted.  For most of its life the 
navy mounted those guns on larger ships more conducive to warfare in the open seas.  
Two ships of the squadron, the United States and the Constitution were 44-gun heavy 
frigates that saw action in the War of 1812.  Perry and most of the flag officers after him 
begged the navy to give the squadron smaller ships useful in West Africa’s estuaries and 
broad rivers, and more of them.  Flag officers also requested steam ships for use in 
Africa’s often calm winds.  The navy did finally send steamers in the late 1850s. 
Perry, out of necessity, established the Africa Squadron’s supply depot at Porto 
Praya in the Cape Verde Islands.  While Monrovia seemed a more logical choice, it was 
in the region of Africa known as the “White Man’s Grave” because of the diseases that 
afflicted Europeans in the area.  Nor was there a real port on that part of the coast.  Porto 
Praya, though, was thousands of miles from the slaving areas in the Bight of Biafra and 
the Gulf of Guinea, minimizing the time that the fleet could spend on suppression duty.  
Because of the lack of good ports in West Africa for personnel to take liberty captains 
took their ships to Madeira in the Canary Islands, even farther from the slaving regions 
for rest and relaxation.  Again, it was not until the late 1850s that the navy moved the 
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supply depot to Loanda, in the middle of the slaving areas, that the squadron became 
more effective. 
As for flag officers of the Africa Squadron the United States Navy seemed to 
simply be throwing darts at a list of names.  Two of the commanders died immediately 
after their service.  Three were “unemployed” by the navy for extended periods of time – 
a mark of an undistinguished record.  Some commanders were officers of note.  Perry 
was the most important American naval commander between the War of 1812 and the 
Second World War.  Commodore Charles Skinner was the only commander of the group 
to see action during the Civil War.170  Isaac Mayo commanded a squadron that 
bombarded Veracruz during the Mexican War, leading a party in support of General 
Winfield Scott’s landing.  Francis Gregory had nearly forty years of service before 
assignment to the Africa Squadron, eighteen of those years in active sea service; he 
became Superintendent of the Ironclad Bureau during the Civil War and was promoted 
him to Rear Admiral before retirement.171  Andrew Hull Foote rose to the rank of Rear 
Admiral during the Civil War.172  One cannot make the charge that the flag officers of the 
squadron were ill-prepared for their work.  The captains could not have been prepared to 
take on the friendly fire delivered from home. 
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Captains Versus Courts 
The flag officers did not get a lot of help from their own courts.  The legal issues 
that plagued the British suppression squadron in the 1820s now plagued the Africa 
Squadron in the 1840s.  American courts were not always on the side of the navy, 
particularly when the captain making the charge was out to sea thousands of miles away.  
The proviso in the 1819 act, that the alleged slavers be tried in courts from the port in 
which they left, got the slavers trials in front of friendly juries.  Convictions were further 
slowed by the 1820 law equating slaving with piracy and punishing piracy with death; 
juries were not keen to put their countrymen to death.  Only one master was convicted 
under the 1820 law and hanged.  
Different judges looked at evidence differently.  Some judges looked at the cargo 
taken from the ship independently and justified each piece as potential goods to be sold 
on the African coast for possibly something other than slaves and, therefore, threw out 
the case.  Other judges pieced the cargo together into a pattern of goods usually sold for 
slaves or used in the transport of slaves and brought the alleged to trial.  It did not take 
captains long to figure out exactly what ships were likely to be let go and which had the 
potential to be condemned.  Seeing the port city on the paperwork allowed a captain to 
judge the likelihood of condemnation.  “Capture all of the Key West vessels you want, 
but don’t touch one from Charleston.”  “Judge Sprague at Boston is all right, but watch 
out for Judge Betts at New York.”  “Try to get your prizes into Norfolk because Judge 
Hallyburton gives good decisions.”173  There was no point in sending a ship to a court 
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that was going to rule in favor of the ship’s owner and potentially have a countersuit filed 
against them. 
Sending a ship to the wrong judge may have hit a naval captain in the pocketbook 
as well.  Captains John Bispham of the Boxer and Lewis Simonds of the Marion made 
what they believed were good seizures of alleged slavers in 1846.  The judges in the 
United States ruled that the seizures were made wrongfully and released the ships and 
their owners.  The judges, though, did not issue “Certificates of Probable Cause” and the 
ships owners filed suit against the captains for damages.  When the Bispham asked the 
navy to indemnify him the navy refused.174  The squadron made no seizures until 1850 a 
year after Federal Judge John J. Kane ordered that captains not be made liable for 
seizures of ships reasonably believed to be slavers.175  Yet even after the Kane decision 
captains worried about the dispositions of their cases.  As late as 1860 William E. LeRoy 
of the Mystic seized a suspicious vessel and sent a note to the court pleading: 
Should my expectations not be realized, I most earnestly hope that the Court will 
find the cause of suspicion sufficiently strong to relieve me from all claims for 
damage &c., that terror of all our naval officers who strive for conscious 
discharge of their duties on this station.176 
The vessel was in fact released, but the seizure was “reasonable” enough in the eyes of 
the judge to issue a certificate of probable cause, saving LeRoy from a potential damage 
suit. 
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Andrew Hull Foote: “Praying Like a Saint; Fighting Like the Devil” 
Judge Kane’s decision opened the door for a reinvigorated Africa Squadron.  The 
most vigorous of its captains was Lieutenant Andrew Hull Foote.  Foote was a 
Connecticut “Yankee” known for his religious fervor, a lay preacher who kept his ship 
“dry” by convincing his crew to take monetary compensation rather than the standard 
ration of grog.   His religion fueled his zealous approach in his work against the traffic in 
slaves.  Gregory said of Foote that he “prays like a Saint and fights like the devil.”177  He 
had already made three seizures while cruising off of Brazil between December 1848 and 
February 1849.178 
Foote’s zeal was tempered by an appreciation for the situation in which he was 
thrust.  In his recollection of the Africa Squadron, Africa and the American Flag, he 
noted the difficulty of the position in which American captains were placed: 
Every person interested in upholding the rights of humanity, or concerned in the 
progress of Africa, will sympathize with the capture and deliverance of a 
wretched cargo of African slaves from the grasp of a slaver, irrespective of his 
nationality.  But it is contrary to national honor and national interests that the right 
of capture should be entrusted to the hands of any foreign authority.  In a 
commercial point of view, if this were granted, legal traders would be molested, 
and American commerce suffer materially from a power which keeps afloat a 
force of armed vessels, more than four times the men-of-war commissioned by 
the United States.  The deck of an American vessel, under its flag, is the territory 
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of the United States, and no other authority but the United States must ever be 
allowed to exercise jurisdiction over it.179 
On June 7, 1850, near Ambriz, Foote overhauled a large ship, with two tiers of 
port holes, flying American colors.  It was the Martha.  When the boarding party went on 
board the captain, noticing the U.S. Navy uniforms, lowered the Stars and Stripes and 
hoisted Brazilian colors.  When the officers from the Perry arrived the captain stated that 
they could not seize a ship flying Brazilian colors.  When asked for papers and other 
proof of nationality, the captain replied that he had none, to which the officer from the 
Perry stated that a ship without papers could be seized as a pirate and the master hanged.  
At the same time the captain’s desk was thrown overboard.  A second boat from the 
Perry fished the desk out of the water; inside were papers indicating that the captain was 
an American and that the ship was three-fifths owned by an American living in Rio de 
Janeiro.  The captain relented, admitting that he intended to load eighteen hundred slaves 
on the coast and slip the blockade.  Inside the hull of the ship was 166 casks of water, one 
hundred fifty barrels of farina, several sacks of beans, four boilers, four hundred spoons, 
a slave deck already laid, and between thirty and forty muskets.  The Martha was seized 
and sent to New York where it was condemned as a slaver.  The captain paid three 
thousand dollars bail, and promptly disappeared, avoiding the death penalty.  The mate 
was sentenced to two years in prison.180 
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Foote put in at Loando to discuss with the British two visits of American 
merchants by their cruisers.  In March the barque Navarre was seized by the British 
steamer Fire Fly.  The Navarre flew the American flag when it was boarded, but the 
boarding officer had doubts of its true nationality since its papers did not appear to be in 
order.  When the officer stated that it was his duty to send the vessel to an American 
man-of-war or to New York the master hauled down the American flag, tossed it 
overboard, and replaced it with Brazilian colors.  A second man came on deck claiming 
to be the master and that the ship was Brazilian.  When the hatches were opened and the 
Navarre was shown to be fully-fitted for the slave trade, the vessel was seized.181 
On July 2, 1850, the British steam sloop Rattler made a visit to the American-
flagged Volusia, which was likewise fully-equipped for the slave trade.  Upon inspection 
of her papers the signatures on the registry were found to have been erased, while other 
papers seemed to be forgeries as well.  The master, the supercargo and chief mate of the 
vessel made declarations that the ship was a bona fide Brazilian and promptly destroyed 
the registry and the muster roll.  The vessel was taken to the British court at St. Helena 
for adjudication.182 
The British claimed to pay every respect to the American flag; visits were made in 
strict accordance to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty and possession of ships was only 
taken after the American flag was taken down.183  The British commodore explained to 
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Foote that the vessels were either wholly or in part owned by Brazilians, and were they 
known to be American, no British officer would have presumed to capture or interfere 
with them.  Foote replied from the documents and other testimony that the Navarre and 
Volusia were bona fide American vessels that had been interfered with and, whether 
legitimate or illegitimate traders, they were not to be touched by British cruisers.184  He 
emphasized that the slave trade was not illegal under the Law of Nations, but the United 
States had declared the slave trade illegal in a municipal sense, and that “we choose to 
punish our rascals our own way.”185  The British acceded and, with the American legal 
point made, the two sides returned to patrolling. 
It would not be long before the British molested another American-flagged ship.  
The brigantine Louisa Beaton was closely watched by the British at Ambriz and had been 
visited on the suspicion of having taken on slaves.  This proved to be untrue.  HMS 
Dolphin fell in with the Louisa Beaton on September 9 as it made its way from the coast 
and a chase ensued; the Dolphin was compelled to put a shot across the American’s bow 
to force it to heave to.  When the Louisa Beaton was boarded the master provided the 
ships registry and a “Transfer of Masters” form, but when asked for further papers, he 
refused.  One of the crew was recognized as having been in charge of another slaver, the 
Lucy Ann.  Suspicions raised, the commander seized the Louisa Beaton to be delivered to 
the Americans. 
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When Foote visited the Louisa Beaton it was noted that the ship’s registry and the 
“Transfer of Masters” form was all that needed to be inspected and, those being in order, 
were not grounds for seizure.  The master was under no obligation to show any other 
paperwork.  The British were compelled to resign the ship and Foote pronounced the 
seizure and detention of the vessel “wholly unauthorized” and “contrary to both the letter 
and the spirit of the eighth article of the Treaty of Washington.”  Foote further stated that 
if the master demanded remuneration for the “unfortunate detention,” he was entitled to 
it.  The British expressed great regret for what had occurred, begged pardon of the 
master, stated that no disrespect was offered to the American flag, and that they would do 
anything in their power to “repair the wrong.”186  The master made no such claim. 
Having spent the bulk of his cruise south of “The Line,” Foote recommended a 
greater United States presence at Loanda.  He noted that the United States carried more 
legitimate traffic in the area than Britain or France and without an American naval 
presence slavers were not deterred from prostituting the American flag.  His suggestion 
for resolving the problem was the creation of a supply depot and the stationing of two 
permanent ships, along with the appointment of a consul for the region.187  A larger 
presence would deter the British from illegally visiting legitimately American-flagged 
traders.   
The workhorse of the Africa Squadron in the early 1850s was Lieutenant Andrew 
Hull Foote, the most important captain since Perry.  The capture of the Martha and the 
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Chatsworth, with the three slavers he captured off of Brazil in three months of 1848-
1849, gave Foote more seizures than any other captain in the history of the squadron.  His 
deft handling of diplomatic issues of the right to visit American-flagged ships by British 
men-of-war showed that naval captains, with the proper amount of zeal, could balance 
the line between interdicting those engaged in the inhumane traffic, while protecting the 
American flag.  In the larger scheme Foote’s zeal may have been counterproductive.  The 
protection that the U.S. Navy was affording American-flagged ships caused the British 
Parliament to reconsider its position on slave trade suppression.  In 1850, it nearly voted 
to give up the effort. 
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CHAPTER TEN: PARLIAMENT RECONSIDERS SUPPRESSION 
In the 1840s two legal situations cast additional doubt on the legality of the 
British suppression operations.  The first called into question the actions of the navy on 
land: pressuring African kings to abolish slavery, obtaining treaties with those kings, and 
burning warehouses containing the goods that White traders used to buy slaves in their 
kingdoms.  The other case involved slavers from the new nation of Brazil; a former 
possession of Portugal, Brazil did not accede to the anti-slave trade provisions of the 
Anglo-Portuguese treaty, rather, they stepped-up their own operations.  Coupled with the 
legal issues raised by the United States, Parliament, sensing that it was not worth the cost 
diplomatically, seriously considered giving up the effort. 
Captain Denman fires the Barracoons 
In 1840 Captain Stephen Denman of the Royal Navy took the effort against the 
slavers inland.  Captain Denman implemented a close port blockade of the Gallinas 
River, between Sierra Leone and Liberia, a major outlet for Spanish slavers that included 
“barracoons” holding 900 slaves ready for transport.  Denman was asked by the governor 
of Sierra Leone to liberate two Sierra Leoneans that were being held by the King of 
Gallinas.  Denman went ashore visiting the king and demanding that he release the 
English subjects and further demanded that he abolish the slave trade in his kingdom.  
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When the king assented Denman took the British subjects back to his ship and instructed 
his marines to release the slaves and set fire to the barracoons.188 
Lord Palmerston directed the Navy to start similar operations on other parts of the 
coast, but some within the government refused to back the actions, wondering “What 
security had any merchant [of legitimate commerce], British or foreign, that an 
overzealous naval officer would not burn his goods on the beaches of Africa?”  Lawyers 
doubted that these actions were covered by existing treaties.189  One of the slavers in the 
Gallinas operation, a Spaniard named Buron, sued Denman for trespassing and seizure of 
his property.  In the resulting case of Buron vs. Denman the Attorney General, arguing 
for Denman on behalf of the Crown, stated that, if Buron owned the slaves in the 
barracoon it was in violation Spanish law and the terms of the Anglo-Spanish treaty.  
Denman was furthermore authorized to destroy the barracoons by virtue of the treaty 
signed with the King of Gallinas.  The court found Denman not guilty, and the blockade 
and burn operations continued.190 
Lord Aberdeen questioned the decision of the court.  Citing the Le Louis case he 
issued a letter to the navy advising them that the tactics employed by Denman were not 
supported by the government.  An effective tool was taken from the navy and when the 
Aberdeen Letter became public, slavers became more aggressive in their own operations.  
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The Royal Navy’s suppression efforts, like those of the U.S. Navy, were once again being 
challenged by their own government. 
The Felicidade Case 
On February 27, 1845 HMS Wasp captured Felicidade in the Atlantic fully-
equipped for the slave trade.  Eighteen men were ordered to navigate the slaver to Sierra 
Leone while the Brazilian crew was detained in a lower hold of the ship.  As the two 
navigated toward the African coast another slaver, Echo, was sighted and they gave 
chase.  The better sailing qualities of Felicidade allowed her to outrun Wasp and 
ultimately capture Echo laden with 400 slaves.  Ten men of Felicidade’s prize crew were 
commanded to detain the crew of Echo and navigate her into Sierra Leone, leaving eight 
men on the former.  As the two ships turned toward Africa again the detainees on board 
Felicidade broke free from the hold and killed their British captors, dumping their bodies 
overboard.  Felicidade next sheered-off from Echo and headed out to sea. 
Three days later Felicidade was stopped by HMS Star.  The crew was detained 
again and the ship was searched.  The wounds on the crewmen and the bloodstains on the 
ship’s deck piqued the interest of the captain, and when the master of ship and a servant 
confessed to the attack, the Brazilians were put in irons, loaded on board the Star, and 
taken to Britain where they were convicted by a British court and sentenced to be hanged.  
Four days before the execution date the lawyer for the “Felicidade pirates” got a retrial.  
Lawyers asked who were the pirates: The Brazilian crew of the Brazilian ship, or the 
seamen of the Royal Navy which boarded her and detained her crew?  The 1826 treaty 
between Britain and newly-independent Brazil did not have an Equipment Clause, 
without which the ship was seized under false pretenses.  The killing of the British sailors 
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was justified as it was during the fight to retake their own ship.  The British appeals court 
exonerated the Brazilians, and the government paid for their return to Brazil.191 
With the acquittal of the Felicidade pirates, slavers began flying Brazilian colors.  
The British determined that Brazil was not enforcing the Anglo-Brazilian treaty and that 
they were allowing their flag to be flown under false pretenses.  Parliament passed the 
Aberdeen Act in 1845, allowing the Royal Navy to seize Brazilian ships, full or empty, 
north or south of the Equator, outside or inside of Brazilian territorial waters.192  In 1850 
the British began an undeclared war against Brazil, going so far as to seize and burn 
Brazilian slavers inside of Brazilian territorial waters.  Brazil’s legislature was strong-
armed into voting to abolish the slave trade.193 
Lord Hutt’s Attack on the Fleet 
Some in Parliament questioned the tactics of the suppression fleet and its 
effectiveness.  In 1848 Sir William Hutt asked the House of Commons “For the 
Appointment of a Select Committee to consider the best means which Great Britain can 
adopt for the providing for the final Extinction of the Slave Trade.”  The title of the bill 
was a thin veil for Hutt’s purpose, for the author had no interest in improving the station.  
He sought to end its mission.  He believed that he could convince most men “whose 
heads were not filled with spurious philanthropy” that the squadron was not carrying out 
its mission.  It could not carry out its mission, and that the British were merely “pouring 
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forth human blood like water, for an object which it was impossible…to obtain.”194  Hutt 
questioned the morality of enforcing philanthropy at the point of a gun and demanding 
that all other countries follow their lead in suppressing the slave trade.  As it was, most 
other countries had withdrawn their support for a suppression fleet: Spain and Portugal 
never had fleets of their own and France had recently withdrawn theirs.  Although the 
United States had a squadron, it was too small to be effective and the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty allowed it to be withdrawn at any time.195  Suppression of the slave trade by 
Britain and the United States was a great hypocrisy anyway, as most of the ships being 
used were “clippers” built in Baltimore, and much of the capital used in the trade was 
manufactured in English factories. 
Hutt also argued that the fleet was allowing enormous profits for slavers rather 
than making their lives more difficult.  Slaves could be bought on the African coast for 
four pounds and sold in Brazil or Cuba for eighty pounds.  At the same time the fleet was 
making the life of slaves in transport more difficult.  The fear of detection by British 
cruisers caused slavers to become hasty in their work; when slaving was legal slavers 
would have taken time to “properly” load their cargo, now slavers loaded quickly, 
sometimes leaving needed provisions behind in the rush to get to sea undetected.  Once 
underway, slavers modified their ships to look like legitimate traders compromising the 
health of their victims below.  Hutt lastly protested the high cost of maintaining the 
station, estimating that the British taxpayer could be saved £600,000 ($42 million) per 
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year by withdrawing the squadron.  The human cost of lives spent “in the most 
pestilential region in the world” was also too enormous for so small a return.196 
Lord Palmerston then rose.  He had devoted his political career to maintaining the 
squadron, negotiating American involvement in suppression, protesting the decisions of 
the British courts to release slavers on technicalities, and strong-arming the Brazilians 
into abolishing the trade.  And while he doubted many of the facts of Hutt’s speech, 
Palmerston stated that he would not oppose the creation of the committee that Hutt had 
proposed.197 
The Select Committee heard testimony throughout 1848 and 1849.  Faith in the 
power of the Navy to suppress the trade was mixed.  A statement from Her Majesty’s 
confidential advisors doubted that using Royal Navy could ever suppress the trade as “It 
is an evil that can never be adequately encountered by any system of mere prohibition 
and penalties.”198  Commodore Sir Charles Hotham testified that the squadron was not 
able to diminish the demand for slaves in America, and despite twenty-six vessels 
specifically given to that mission the navy was not up to the task of suppressing the trade.  
Other officers expressed their doubt that the Royal Navy could suppress the trade.  A few 
officers argued that the trade could be suppressed with more ships and appropriate 
treaties with African kings.  Captain Denman stated that he would put down the slave 
trade within two years by a plan of his own.   
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On March 19, 1850, Hutt introduced his bill to bring home the suppression fleet.  
In introducing his bill he stated the historical fact that the complete suppression of an 
illegal trade is not possible, noting that in the days of Napoleon’s continental system 
British goods made it to all of the capitals of Europe, “and frequently were laid at the 
very doors of the Tuilaries.”199  Hutt stated numerous reasons for his opposing the use of 
the Suppression Squadron.  He opposed the squadron based on its expense.  He opposed 
the squadron based upon its futility.  He opposed it on account of its cruelty.200  He 
opposed it because he hated to see such a great and noble country engaged in a conflict 
carried on by a means so violent and, at the same time, so inadequate to the ends 
proposed, so as to cut us off from the cooperation and sympathy of other states.  He 
opposed the squadron because of the bad terms it had placed the people of Britain with 
Brazil, France, and the United States.201  Hutt recounted the history of the suppression 
fleet and the measures that failed bring about the extinction of the slave trade – an 
“Equipment Clause,” a close blockade of the African coast, a joint cruising arrangement 
with the French navy, an undeclared war with Brazil – all of these failed to slow the 
trade.  Any further action was as well likely to end in failure. 
With these arguments set before the House of Commons Lord Hutt proposed: 
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that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty 
will be pleased to direct that negotiations be forthwith entered into for the purpose 
of releasing this country from all treaty engagements with Foreign States, for 
maintaining armed vessels on the coast of Africa to suppress the traffic in 
slaves.202 
One of Hutt’s allies was Anstey.  He defended the Aberdeen letter, noting that it 
was wholly consistent with Lord Stowell’s decision in the Le Louis case; Britain was not 
justified in assuming rights which did not belong to her, merely because she intended to 
employ them for a laudable purpose.  That being the case he regretted the untenable 
position that the squadron had placed men like Denman: to act on the suspicion of a 
vessel being a slaver makes them liable in civil courts for an illegal seizure, but to not act 
makes them liable to military courts on charges of mutiny for disobeying the orders of his 
superiors.203 
Those on the other side of the aisle defended the humanitarianism of the 
squadron.  Many refused to accept a proposal to reverse the suppression policies already 
established.204  Others argued that the British had prevented a large number of slaves 
from being sent to Brazil and to the Spanish colonies, despite the self-defeating measures 
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from the Foreign Office and the Board of the Admiralty: warships that were sent to the 
station were inappropriate for the work, treaties with Spain and Brazil emasculated the 
squadron in facing ships bearing their flag, and the letter from the Earl of Aberdeen, 
criticizing Denman’s actions against the Gallinas barracoons, gave great encouragement 
to slavers at the expense of Britain’s own officers.  For the supporters of suppression, 
what Hutt perceived as the failures of the fleet could easily be corrected. 
At the end of the day the House divided: “Ayes” were 154 and “Noes” were 
232.205  The Suppression Squadron would continue its operations.  It seems as though 
Parliament was split along the lines of humanitarianism and economy.  Most of the 
debate in favor of relieving the squadron was based upon what was best for the British 
taxpayer and those opposed to relieving the squadron did so for humanitarian reasons.  
Part of Hutt’s argument was wrapped around the immunity of ships under foreign flags; 
American and French protests were beginning to find allies in Parliament.  Hutt would 
bring the issue to the floor again eight years later. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCESSION: GREAT BRITAIN RENOUNCES THE RIGHT 
TO SEARCH; THE UNITED STATES ALLOWS THE RIGHT TO SEARCH 
A series of incidences occurring in the second half of the 1850s compelled the 
British to reverse course on demanding the right to search from the United States.  The 
two countries were taken to the brink when a number of American ships were fired upon 
by British cruisers in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.  In an effort to quiet 
American voices clamoring for war the British decided to stop agitating for the right to 
visit.  For a moment it seemed that the Americas had gotten their way. 
With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 the United States was forced to give-
up its own slave trade suppression duties.  As the navy was recalled to blockade the 
Confederacy the United States was unable to uphold its part of the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty.  Secretary of State William Seward negotiated a new treaty with Britain allowing 
the British to the right to visit and search American-flagged ships.  The slave trade 
suppression plans had come full circle and the British finally received that for which they 
were looking. 
The Return of Lewis Cass 
In 1857 a person familiar with Great Britain, the suppression of the slave trade, 
and the right to visit and took the reins of the State Department.  Democrat James 
Buchanan won the Presidential election of 1856 and made Lewis Cass his Secretary of 
State.  Cass had not held a position at the national level since he resigned as Minister to 
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France in 1842 in protest of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.  With his appointment as 
Secretary of State in 1856 he was now the main representative of the United States in 
matters of foreign policy. 
At this time the slave trade was focused mainly on the island of Cuba, so the 
British changed their focus from the Atlantic to the Caribbean believing that it was easier 
to intercept inbound slavers in a small ring around the island than to blockade the entire 
coast of Africa.  This change put them in more direct contact with the United States near 
and sometimes inside of American waters.  Recognizing the collision course that the 
British had set the two nations upon, Secretary of State Cass delivered a reminder to the 
British concerning visits of American merchant ships: 
There, no doubt, may be circumstances which would go far to modify the 
complaints a nation would have a right to make for such a violation of 
sovereignty.  If the boarding officer had just grounds for suspicion, and deported 
himself with propriety in the performance of his task, doing no injury, and 
peaceably retiring when satisfied of his error, no nation would make such an act 
the subject of serious reclamation.206 
Fourteen years after the Quintuple Treaty, Cass continued to be inflexible 
concerning British visits of American ships. 
In April and May 1858 there was a series of what the United States considered 
unnecessary British visits of American ships in the Gulf of Mexico and inside Cuban 
waters.  Reports of American merchant ships being fired into by British cruisers, boarded, 
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and searched without permission, appeared in New York newspapers.  One report stated 
that a British boat manned by fifteen men and an officer visited twelve American vessels 
in the harbor of Sagua la Grande, Cuba, inspecting papers, searching the ships’ holds and 
breaking into casks.207  News of these incidents caused outrage in the United States and 
Cass delivered a formal protest to the British government.208   
The British government informed the American ambassador in London, George 
M. Dallas, that if the reported actions did, in fact occur, that they were unwarranted.  The 
British suggested that the young and inexperienced officers of the West India Squadron 
were to blame, acting with excessive zeal in carrying out their instructions.209  Orders 
were dispatched to the West India Squadron to be cautious in its approach to American 
merchant ships. 
 The United States would not let the issue go away quietly.  In Congress there 
were calls for war.  Representative Clark Cochrane of New York complained of the 
British that, “No nation can arrogate to herself the police and espionage of the ocean, 
without violating its freedom and trampling upon the honor and rights of others.”210  He 
then made a plea to international maritime law: 
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It follows as a necessary corollary from these settled doctrines of international and 
maritime law – doctrines forever fixed and forever closed to the discussions of 
mankind – that an assault upon or the assumption of control over the ships of one 
country, no matter for what cause or under what pretext…is an act of hostility, an 
invasion of national jurisdiction, and a breach of public law, and if avowed, 
constitute a just cause of war.211 
Cass used these incidences to gain concessions from the British.   
In London Ambassador Dallas appealed to Foreign Secretary Malmesbury to 
modify the way that British cruisers visited American ships.  Malmesbury responded with 
a memorandum stating that it was necessary for the two sides to come to an arrangement 
to verify the nationality of vessels suspected of carrying false colors, and, until then, 
“orders will be given to discontinue search of United States vessels.”212  The United 
States took the memorandum as the British yielding on the issue of the right to visit and 
search American ships. 
Another player taking note of the events in the Caribbean was Lord William Hutt.  
With the actions of the navy as a pretext he reopened discussion in the House of 
Commons for ending the mission of the suppression fleet again.  The bill died, but he did 
get the following concession when the Commons ruled that:  
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It is expedient to discontinue the practice of authorizing Her Majesty’s ships to 
visit and search vessels under Foreign Flags, with a view of suppressing the Slave 
Trade.213 
The following year Foreign Secretary Lord Malmesbury acceded to the change in policy.  
The House of Lords sought clarity in the modified position of the British toward the right 
to visit and search.  Lord Lyndhurst referenced Sir William Scott, stating:  
No nation can exercise the right of visitation and search on the high seas except 
on the belligerent claim. No such right has ever been claimed, nor can it be 
exercised, without the oppression of interrupting and harassing the real and lawful 
navigation of other countries, for the right, when it exists at all, is universal, and 
will extend to all countries. If I were to press the consideration further, it would 
be by stating the gigantic mischiefs which such a claim is likely to produce.214 
He proceeded to state his opposition to the British-assumed “Right to Visit.”  The 
right to visit is the same thing as the right to search, for 
the moment you call for an examination of the papers—the moment you ask a 
single question the visit becomes a search—so that the visit to a particular vessel 
for the purpose of inquiry, is in effect the exercise of a right comprehended in the 
words droit de visite…. [W]hat right, I ask, has any person to go on board a vessel 
to visit it without the consent of the master?  The same principle applies that I 
have just laid down.215 
Foreign Secretary Lord Malmesbury then confirmed: 
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[W]e have abandoned the right of search and visit; and that the American 
Government have agreed to entertain and to consider any suggestion we may 
make to give security against the fraudulent use of the flags of either nation; and 
that the French Government are ready and anxious to assist us in our endeavours 
to attain the same object.216 
Interestingly, at the time that the British were giving up the right to search, 
American slave trade suppression became much more effective.  In the fall of 1860 the 
squadron under flag officer William Inman seized three slavers carrying a total more than 
two thousand slaves.  Nathaniel Gordon, the master of the Erie which was carrying 900 
slaves, was convicted of piracy and became the only person hanged under the 1820 
law.217  Then suppression came to an abrupt end. 
The Civil War and the Slave Trade Suppression Treaty of 1862 
With the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and the secession of Southern 
states in the following months, the stage was set for an end to the semantic game that 
plagued the effort of suppress the slave trade.  With Southern senators recalled to their 
states, the North dominated Senate complied with each of the administrations attacks on 
the slave trade.  With American warships on patrol in the blockade of the Confederacy 
the United States could not uphold its end of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.  Secretary of 
State John Seward negotiated a treaty with Great Britain in 1862 allowing them the right 
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to search vessels flying the American flag.218  The British finally received what they 
sought for half a century.  It is ironic that Parliament had rescinded that right just four 
years earlier.  With the Union victory in the Civil War and abolition of slavery by the 
Thirteenth Amendment the slave trade slowed to a trickle.  When the Spanish abolished 
slavery in Cuba in 1880 the Transatlantic Slave Trade was drawn to a close. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSION - BEING “THE CONSTABLE OF THE 
WORLD” 
The trade in slaves was ultimately brought to a close with pressure on both ends 
of the supply chain.  On the American demand side the United States ended slavery with 
the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution following the Civil War.  Brazil ended 
slavery in the 1850s, leaving Cuba the only market for slaves; the Spanish ended slavery 
in Cuba in the 1880s.  On the African supply side the integration of Africa in to the 
European colonial system with the Berlin Conference in 1875 drove the slave factories 
out of business.  Does this mean that the British suppression fleet and the U.S. Navy 
Africa Squadron were failures?  Many have said so.  For Africans packed in the hull of a 
slaver, chained two-by-two at the wrists and ankles, with no room to sit up on the slave 
deck, and kept alive on farina, horsebeans and a cup of water a day, they would likely say 
differently. 
Sovereignty and the Right to Search 
Despite the detractors the British should be honored for taking the lead in the 
suppression of the slave trade.  In doing so they opened up a new form of diplomacy 
based upon human rights.  Unlike others that sat on the sideline the British poured 
millions of dollars and hundreds of lives into the effort.  Their diplomatic efforts are to be 
commended as well, exposing those nations whose flags stilled covered an inhumane 
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trade, not the least of which was the United States.  But this episode in history shows just 
how difficult it is to enforce human rights laws. 
The United States itself was walking a thin line between the humanity of 
suppressing the slave trade and the legal right of sovereign states as codified in the Law 
of Nations.  International Law recognizes the deck of a ship sovereign territory of the 
flag-state under which it sails.  British Justice Sir William Scott and United States Justice 
John Marshall both ruled that, the fact that two states had abolished the slave trade did 
not mean that one could adjudicate for the other.  The British could not seize American 
ships on the premise that the United States had abolished the trade.  Under the Law of 
Nations at the time the British could only seize American ships by the terms of a 
reciprocal right to search treaty, but the United States had serious issues with granting the 
British the right to stop and board their ships.  This arrangement smacked of 
impressment, and sailors being forced to serve and die for the Royal Navy remained long 
in the collective American memory.  John Adams exposed the hypocrisy of the British 
claim for the right to search equating the impressment of American sailors with African 
slavery.  In both cases a human being was inspected, clapped in irons, taken from their 
home, flogged, and forced into labor against their will.  Impressment was still an issue as 
late as 1842 when Great Britain and the United States negotiated the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty. 
The Northerner most adamant against British claim for the right to search was 
Lewis Cass of Michigan.  Part of Cass’s motivation may have been youthful exuberance 
following his own fight against the British in the War of 1812.  What was Cass’s 
motivation for undermining the Quintuple Treaty and his vehemence against the 
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Webster-Ashburton Treaty though?  His opposition to the right to search was not because 
he wanted to protect the American slave trade; it was based upon the respect of American 
sovereignty under the Law of Nations. 
The Southerner most opposed to British suppression policies was Nicholas Trist 
of Virginia, the American Consul-General in Havana.  His actions were not particularly 
in the interest of promoting slavery, although he had strong opinions concerning 
abolitionists trying to incite slaves to rebellion in the South.  He believed that the British 
were overstepping their legal bounds in their suppression activities and, when Palmerston 
sent to abolitionists to act as the Commission for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, he 
never recognized their legal standing and ignored them for as long as he could.   
The British eventually conceded that bona fide American vessels were immune 
from British interference, but what, they asked, was to be done with ships that had 
obtained the right to the flag illegally?  To allow those ships to be boarded and searched 
would lead to a slippery slope.  One British officer would make the claim that “I knew it 
was not an American.”  The next would claim that “I believed that it was not an 
American.”  The third would claim that “I thought it was not an American.”  The slippery 
slope leads from “knowing,” to “believing,” to “thinking.”  Ultimately it leads to “I did 
not know, so I put a shot across his bow, forced him to heave to, boarded him, broke open 
his hatches, and inspected his cargo.”  The British claimed that this was never their 
intention, but in the 1842 Captain Bouet, the commander of the French squadron in West 
Africa, charged that the British were making no distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate trade, and were stopping and harassing French merchant ships all along the 
African coast while letting their own ships pass unmolested.  
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Lord Aberdeen was adamant that the British had the right to “visit” suspicious 
vessels under the cover of the American flag, boarding them only for the purpose of 
inspecting the ship’s papers to check if it had the right to fly the flag.  This was 
justification for British stopping of American ships in the 1830s.  Not everyone in Great 
Britain was behind Aberdeen though.  Lord Lyndhurst claimed that when an officer 
boarded a ship, the moment a paper was examined, the moment that a question was 
asked, the visit became a search.  Cass called this a “vexatious visit,” and liable to serious 
abuse.  In 1858 young British captains made “vexatious visits,” firing cannon into 
American merchant ships, called overly “zealous” in the carrying out of their orders.  
These actions forced Parliament to end the claim to the right to visit and the right to 
search.  The statute of international law stating that a ship was the sovereign territory of 
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